




AIR FORCE HANDBOOK 10-2502
30 October 2001

**USAF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
(WMD) THREAT PLANNING AND RESPONSE
HANDBOOK**



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

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USAF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) THREAT PLANNING AND RESPONSE HANDBOOK

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Certified by: HQ AFCESA/CC (Colonel Bruce R. Barthold)
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This handbook provides United States Air Force personnel worldwide with information for pre-incident planning and post-incident response. The handbook supports AFI 10-2501, *Full Spectrum Threat Response Planning and Operations*, and AFI 10-2601, *Counter-Nuclear Biological, and Chemical Operations, Passive Defense*, and integrates instructions applicable across USAF planning and response functions. Some information contained in this handbook was extracted from relevant Department of Defense and Air Force publications, and other open-source materials.

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OVERVIEW

The USAF Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Threat Planning and Response Handbook.

The *USAF WMD Threat Planning and Response Handbook* is designed to assist installation personnel in preparing for and responding to a terrorist WMD incident/attack, both at home and abroad, in peace, during contingencies and wartime. Its purpose is to ensure installation commanders and personnel can continue to perform operational missions, regardless of the terrorist threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) contamination in the base operating environment.

While the handbook contains many elements designed to assist staff planners and responders, its *primary focus is the on-scene commanders and staff*, providing an overhead view of preparation for and response to a terrorist incident/attack (Figure 1) on an installation. The design is meant to inform, but more importantly it is meant to *prompt commander engagement and involvement* in both planning and response. This active command involvement in the planning process ensures unity of effort, most efficient allocation of scarce resources, and identification and correction of shortfalls in response capability.

Figure 1. Terrorist Attack.



The handbook is divided into two complementary parts.

Part A. Scoping the Planning and Response Problem. Part A provides commanders, planners, and responders tools with essential background information necessary to best execute Part B of the handbook. Commanders and staffs should have detailed knowledge of these sections, and responders a working familiarity with the content. In the first portion of the handbook look for the following:

-The Commander's Section.

How to use the handbook.

Background on legal considerations for planning and response.

Requirements for training, educating, assessing, and inspecting.

-General Information

- Installation Baselining and assessing Response Capability.

-Implementation of a planned, cross-functional incident response.

-Notification and Resource Activation Process.

- Recovery from a terrorist WMD incident/attack.
- Recognizing that a biological incident has occurred.

-The **Master WMD Incident Checklist**; all incidents have a common, cross-functional general response flow. This checklist is the master response flow list. The Installation Commander, On-Scene Commander (OSC), Disaster Control Group (DCG) members, and on-site Senior Fire Official (SFO) will find this master incident checklist useful.

Part B. Responders' Tools. Part B provides commanders, planners, and responders with a process walk-through, using a series of graphics and checklists. Responders should have detailed knowledge of these sections, and Commanders and staffs a working familiarity with the content. In Part B look for:

Threat Decision Tree; five individual, terrorist WMD threat-specific "If... Then..." Decision Matrices.

Functional Area Checklists; a set of position- and function-specific planning and response checklists.

Other Tools.

- Cordon Distance Guidance and Default for an Unknown Type WMD incident/attack.
- Notification and Resource Allocation Tables.
- Biological and Chemical Agent Matrices (by type, symptom, treatment).

This handbook provides information that will allow for an integrated, cross-functional planning and response effort at the installation-level. It builds on the existing HAZMAT response capability, but focuses and expands upon that capability to ensure that response for a wider range of threats has been properly planned.

PART A. SCOPING THE PLANNING AND RESPONSE PROBLEM

COMMANDER'S SECTION

Introduction. The installation commander is responsible for the protection of installation personnel, facilities, and resources. One of the most difficult challenges in providing this protection is the emerging, asymmetric terrorist threat. This handbook seeks to help commanders confront this threat and provide for the protection of installation resources (personnel and materiel). It does so by capturing the complete incident response cycle for a terrorist WMD incident/attack, from pre-incident response planning, training and exercising, resourcing, and assessment through incident and post-incident notification, response, and recovery operations.

This handbook covers the terrorist WMD threats, to include:

- Biological.
- Nuclear (or radiological).
- Incendiary.
- Chemical.
- Explosive.

Terrorist WMD incidents exclude such terrorist threats as kidnapping, hijacking, and hostage barricading. A terrorist WMD incident/attack will require the response or assistance of nearly every functional area on an installation; therefore the handbook advocates the involvement of all organizations on an installation in planning and execution, providing an integrated approach across the functional areas.

The handbook captures essential information designed to assist the installation commander, staff, and responders in understanding each other's task, how they do their job, and how it all fits into the big picture of terrorist WMD

threat planning and response. It synthesizes information from many sources to paint a clear picture of an installation's most likely response to an incident.

Using the Handbook: An Overview. The handbook can be used in several ways. It can:

- Assist in planning—developing an installation baseline; establishing a training program; fostering required relationships with the local community; creating a focused exercise, assessment, and inspection program; and identifying and providing sufficient resources to implement the installation's plan.

- Make installation commanders, staffs, and planners more aware of what the response planning and execution elements are doing or will do in response to a terrorist WMD incident/attack.

- Ensure that the necessary tasks have been assigned to an office of primary responsibility.

- Ensure that response elements are properly organized, trained and equipped.

- Focus installation commander involvement at those critical junctures in the planning process to ensure the best use of scarce resources and identification of areas where the response has shortfalls. Commanders can identify these shortfalls to the major commands (MAJCOMs) and higher headquarters for further assistance.

The handbook can be most helpful to the planning staff, as it provides a centralized location for many planning requirements. It will also aid the staff, the DCG, and the designated OSC to understand what should happen during a terrorist WMD incident/attack.

Finally, the handbook will help responders understand how best to help the commander facilitate an effective response by providing various Functional Area Checklist.

The shared understanding that use of this handbook provides to installation commanders, planners, staff, and responders will result in a more fluid, efficient, and complete incident response—a response where a few minutes can mean the difference between success or failure, life or death.

DODI 2000.16, requires commanders at all levels to take appropriate measures to protect DoD personnel and reduce the vulnerability to terrorist use of WMD.

Overview of Legal Considerations. The legal considerations for response to an event on the installation are complex, varying by location, area affected, and type of incident. Commanders should consult their legal staff in the planning process to understand the limitations on response that particular installations might face. Commanders should also assess with their judge advocate general (JAG) the preparedness of the legal staff to deal with terrorist WMD incident/attacks and ensure staff is trained.

This handbook deals with location in terms of incidents that occur domestically within the United States (i.e., within the 50 states, the District of Columbia, US territories or possessions, or other places subject to US jurisdiction) and incidents that occur outside the United States (i.e. in foreign countries in which there are US installations). As far as timing is concerned, it deals with prewar and wartime attacks. Finally, it deals principally with WMD when discussing the incident type.

Terrorist WMD Incidents, Domestic. The use of chemical and biological weapons within the United States is a Federal offense under Title 18, U.S. Code (USC) ...

Section 175 for biological weapons possession.

Section 229 for chemical or biological weapons use as a WMD.

The “commander’s inherent authority to maintain law and order on a military installation...” coupled with the responsibility to protect Air Force personnel, facilities, and equipment also guides response to a prewar incident in the United States, its territories or possessions, the District of Columbia, and other places subject to US jurisdiction. In these cases, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has investigative jurisdiction and should be immediately notified when an incident occurs. Incident locations should be treated as crime scenes, insofar as reasonably possible, and the normal chain of custody procedures should be followed for any item that is removed from the incident scene. These authorities, responsibilities, and actions are in accordance with DoD Directive 5525.5, *DoD Cooperation With Civilian Law Enforcement Officials* and implemented by AFI 10-801, *Assistance to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies*.

Should the effects of an on-installation incident extend to surrounding civilian communities—or when the need to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage is a concern—the installation may respond immediately and report the incident as soon as possible. Further questions may be directed toward the Air Force National Security Emergency Preparedness Agency (AFNSEP) at:

<http://www-afnsep.forscom.army.mil/>.

Pentagon	Atlanta
AFNSEP, Room 5C161	AFNSEP
1480 AF Pentagon	1283 Anderson Way SW
Washington, DC 20330-1480	Fort McPherson, Ga. 30330-1094

When time does not allow the commander or installation to obtain prior approval from higher HQ, and in response to a direct request from a civil authority, the installation *may* respond—in accordance with DoD Directive 3025.1, *Military Support to Civil Authorities* and AFI 10-802, *Military Support to Civil Authorities*.

Furthermore, the “Immediate Response” requires a written request from civil authorities, which includes the nature of the response, and other pertinent information as soon as possible—in accordance with DoD Directive 3025.15, *Military Assistance to Civil Authorities* and AFI 10-802, *Military Support to Civil Authorities*.

Military support provided to civil authorities or civilian law enforcement authorities must comply with the restrictions of 10 USC, Section 371 *et. seq.* and 18 USC., Section 1385, as implemented by DoDD 3025.1, DoDD 3025.15, DoDD 5525.5, AFI 10-801, and AFI 10-802.

Terrorist WMD Incidents in Foreign Countries. Incidents on US installations in foreign countries are generally governed by a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Most SOFAs, such as NATO SOFA Article VII, paragraph 10, and Japan SOFA Article XVII, paragraph 10, state the US has the right to police and maintain order on the premises it occupies.

Most SOFAs require military authorities to assist the host nation authority with incident investigation and turn over all evidence when requested.

Even when conducted overseas, a chemical or biological weapons attack on any property owned, leased, or used by any US agency or department, is a Federal offense—in accordance with Title 18 USC, Section 229 (c)(4).

Generally, U.S. participation in the investigation of an event will be coordinated at the diplomatic level.

Wartime Incidents. The use of chemical or biological weapons in an attack by a belligerent nation against another nation is a violation of the law of armed conflict (LOAC). The use of chemical or biological weapons in an attack by a belligerent nation against any USAF installation, at home or abroad during wartime, should be reported and investigated as a LOAC violation. AFI 51-401, *Training and Reporting to Ensure Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict*, outlines this investigation requirement in detail.

NOTE: The terrorist use of biological or chemical weapons, even during wartime, is a criminal act in the country where it occurs but is not a LOAC violation. Only when nations use biological or chemical weapons does a LOAC violation occur.

Combatant Commands are required to ensure that all LOAC violations involving US or enemy persons are reported promptly to appropriate authorities, are thoroughly investigated, and the results of such investigations are promptly forwarded to the applicable Military Department, in accordance with DoD Directive 5100.77, *DoD Law of War Program*, paragraph 5.8.4.

The U.S. Army, as the DoD Executive Agent for LOAC violation issues, is responsible for ensuring that investigations are performed when biological or chemical weapons have been used, as required by DoDD 5100.77, paragraph 5.6.

Training, Exercising and Assessing. To execute an effective response to a terrorist WMD incident/attack, commanders must ensure that they not only have the manpower and equipment, but also have programs in place to test and validate that response. This can be done through proper command emphasis on training, exercising and assessing programs. Focused at the installation-level, these three inter-related requirements ensure installation commanders, planners, staffs, and responders are best prepared to respond in an integrated, systematic manner to acts of terrorism involving WMD. Installations must also understand and comply with applicable

United States Government (USG), DoD, and service requirements in each of these three areas.

Training should include thorough instruction to prepare responders to safely and efficiently respond to a terrorist WMD incident/attack at the required level of response: awareness, operations, technician, and on-scene commander.

Some USAF personnel may require several levels of training—for example, the on-scene commander must complete awareness and the on-scene commander's course training to serve in that capacity. Each functional response element should refer to its applicable instructional guidance for all training requirements (US Occupational Safety and Health standards for first responders are contained in 29 CFR 1910.120). It is important to note that some training requirements are collective training requirements. To ensure an effective response, an installation-wide, cross-functional training program should be implemented.

Installations must conduct an annual terrorist WMD threat response exercise. Careful planning will enable all installations to complete their terrorist WMD incident/attack response exercise in conjunction with the other required exercises (major accident or attack). The exercises must be cross-functionally executed, and terrorist, WMD threat-specific. They must be terrorist WMD threat planning and response exercises, incorporating all local response elements.

All USAF installations must conduct an internal vulnerability assessment review annually and HHQ vulnerability assessment in accordance with AFI 31-210, The Air Force Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program Standards, to include evaluating the vulnerability to WMD. USAF installations will receive vulnerability assessments from higher headquarters teams (DoD, HQ USAF, or MAJCOM) at least every three years. In addition, a terrorist WMD threat planning and response compliance inspection may be completed at each USAF installation, as deemed appropriate by the USAF IG.

All USAF installations must conduct an annual internal review of installation terrorist WMD threat vulnerability assessments. Pre-incident assessment is critical to success of an installation's WMD threat planning and response to a terrorist incident. The USAF's Vulnerability Assessment Teams (VATs) will periodically visit all installations. DoD Guidance for assessments is extensive. An annual review of the current terrorist WMD threat vulnerability assessment must be completed at each installation.

GENERAL INFORMATION

Introduction. Terrorist threat or use of WMD is among the emerging transnational threats. The absence of other dominating global powers and the existence of overwhelming capability of United States Armed Forces greatly limit terrorist options. Increasing numbers of nations and terrorist groups are compelled to make use of asymmetric measures to accomplish their goals. “Terrorism” defined in Joint Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associate Terms*, as “The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.” This handbook provides guidance for protection against terrorist WMD threats and actions directed against USAF installations.

Traditionally, the perceived threat of terrorism was directed toward installations in foreign countries. Today, the terrorist use of WMD is clearly an emerging threat worldwide. Since USAF personnel, equipment, and facilities at home and abroad are highly visible targets for terrorist attacks, WMD Threat Planning and Response is a high-priority endeavor.

Purpose. One of the most complex challenges for commanders operating in this threat environment is to adequately protect DoD personnel and assets from acts of terrorism. Therefore, there is a need for an immediate response capability on installations to save lives and contain the incident. Planning to confront this challenge requires a comprehensive, integrated approach from threat mitigation to incident response and recovery.

The purpose of this handbook is to satisfy the immediate needs of educating, focusing, instructing, and coordinating the combined efforts of commanders, planners, staff, and responders, allowing each of these elements to understand not only its respective roles and responsibilities, but also those of the other elements. This handbook is not intended to tell the Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) in the functional areas how to do their jobs, but to assist all responders in better understanding and coordinating their

threat/incident planning and response activities, ensuring a more organized, effective and timely response to a terrorist WMD incident/attack. This handbook details how a response to a terrorist WMD incident/attack should occur by adjusting current USAF guidance and describing a cross-functional response.

This will, in turn, assist planners in formulating the guidance, and providing practical, real-world response implementation instruction. The following publications provide the framework for this guide: Joint Pub 3-11, *Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense*; DoD 2000.12H, *Protection of DoD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Terrorism*; AFDD 2-1.8, *Counter NBC Operations*, AFI 31-210, *The Air Force Antiterrorism/Force Protection Program*, AFI 41-106, *Medical Readiness Planning and Training*; AFI 32-4001, *Disaster Preparedness Planning and Operations* (being replaced by AFI 10-2501, *Full Spectrum Threat Response Planning and Operations*); AFI 10-2601, *Counter-NBC Operations, Passive Defense*, AFMAN 32-4004, *Emergency Response Operations* (being replaced by AFMAN 10-2503, *Full Spectrum Threat Response Operations*); AFMAN 32-4005, *Personnel Protection and Attack Actions* (being replaced with AFMAN 10-2602, *Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Conventional (NBCC) Defense Operations and Standards* (currently under development)).

NOTE: At the time this guide was written, most of the WMD-related publications information and numbers were under re-alignment. To ensure you have the most current publications for WMD, contact your local CE Readiness Flight.

The information found in the Base Defense Plan, Antiterrorism/Force Protection Plan, the Installation Security Plan, the Medical Contingency Response Plan, and HAZMAT and Full Spectrum Threat Response Plan 10-2 is required to conduct USAF WMD Threat Response Planning. This information should be tailored and expanded to address the threat of terrorist use of WMD and applicable functional area response. Once planning is

complete, the information should be included in the Full Spectrum Threat Response Plan 10-2 .

The Terrorist WMD Threat. The USAF must prepare for the full range of terrorist threats that installations face today and in the future. These threats currently include incendiary and explosive devices, chemical, biological, and nuclear (radiological) devices, and/or a combination thereof.

This handbook does not include counterterrorism offensive actions to reduce armed hostile confrontations (such as hostage barricade and sniper attacks) on installations. These threats must be eliminated before WMD incident/attack response can be initiated. WMD incidents, unlike armed hostile confrontations, will likely require the response/assistance of almost every functional area on the installation, therefore this Handbook advocates the involvement of all organizations on an installation in the planning and execution process, providing an integrated approach, across the functional areas.

First responders must be vigilant during the response. The FBI has documented an increase in the use of secondary devices targeting first responders and initial law enforcement officers. As a result, responders should assume in every case that any suspected situation contains a fully functional WMD device and to treat it accordingly. Only specially trained and equipped explosive ordnance disposal trained personnel should approach/handle a suspected device. Extreme caution and a high degree of suspicion are required during the response to any terrorist WMD incident/attack.

The following is a brief overview of each incident category:

A *biological incident* may result from the intentional release of bacteria, viruses, rickettsia, or toxins to induce mass casualties. The means of dissemination of these agents encompass four primary methods of entry into the body: inhalation, ingestion, absorption, and injection. While inhalation and ingestion are the most common methods of infection, casualties resulting from absorption or injection are also possible, although much less likely. Biological agents can be devastating. A disturbing reality is the comparative ease with which many of these agents can be obtained. Once acquired, many biological agents, such as smallpox, cholera, or anthrax, are easily adapted for use as a terrorist weapon; only the agent and an effective dispersal system are required. Some dispersal methods, such as using an aerosol spray, can spread agents over vast areas and affect large numbers of people (figure 2). Biological agents typically have a delayed onset of signs or symptoms, aiding migration, hampering identification, complicating personnel decontamination, and delaying treatment. In some cases, unwitting responders could inadvertently spread the agent and escalate the incident rather than contain it. It is important to note that due to the nature of biological agents, an attack could go unrecognized. The section titled “Recognizing That a Biological Incident Has Occurred” of this guide provides information on mitigating a covert biological release.

Figure 2. Biological Agent Release.




A *nuclear incident* can be triggered by any device designed to produce a nuclear yield, or by any device that uses a conventional explosive with nuclear materials, causing a dispersal of radiological particles (figure 3). There are two basic types of devices:

An improvised nuclear device, which uses the fission of special nuclear material (U-235, Pu239, etc.) to create blast and thermal effects, and prompt exposure to gamma and neutron radiation. The fallout from such a device is composed of non-fissioned nuclear material, fission products and activation products. These materials contaminate very large regions downwind from the area impacted by weapon effects. Fallout creates very high external exposure hazards from beta and gamma radiation, and internal exposure hazards from inhalation or ingestion of the fallout.

A radiological dispersion device uses any mechanism to distribute radioactive materials over a given area. Means of dispersal can include chemical explosives, aerosol sprays or hand distribution. The hazard posed is dependent on the type of radioactive material, i.e., what radionuclides are involved, its chemical and physical form, and the nature of the dispersion mechanism. Hazards can include external exposure to beta/gamma radiation, gamma radiation alone, or internal exposure from alpha, beta, or gamma emitting radionuclides that are ingested or inhaled.

Figure 3. Nuclear Incident.



A terrorist could either incorporate readily available radiological materials into an explosive device or use a large explosive to damage a radiological site such as a nuclear power plant. It is often difficult to determine that a radioactive material is involved, so the necessary detection equipment (typically through HAZMAT teams) should be put to use.


An *incendiary incident* (Figure 4) occurs when a mechanical, electrical or chemical device is used intentionally to start a fire. Incendiary devices may be as simple as a match applied to a pool of gasoline or as complex as a remotely ignited chemical compound. Incendiary materials burn with a hot flame for a designated period of time. Their purpose is to set fire to other materials or structures. Frequently, multiple devices may be employed to ensure ignition or aid in spreading the fire. In addition to the presence of the incendiary, the terrorist may weaken the structure or set traps for firefighters to impede fire-suppression efforts and assure themselves of meeting their objective. As with any suspicious device, should an incendiary device be discovered prior to ignition, it should be handled only by specially trained personnel. Handling of such devices by inexperienced individuals could result in ignition and possible injury or death.

Figure 4. Incendiary Incident.



Chemical incidents (Figure 5) can be caused by any device that uses nerve, blister, blood, choking, irritating chemical agents, or industrial chemicals to produce mass casualties. Chemical agents typically enter the body via inhalation, ingestion or absorption. Injection is also possible but less likely. The effects of these agents vary from mild irritation to immediate death. Chemical agent detectors can assist responders in determining the type and quantity of the chemical used and the appropriate countermeasures and level of protection required.

Figure 5. Chemical Incident.



An *explosive incident* (Figure 6) is the result of a device that facilitates the extremely rapid release of gas and heat (explosion); or allows a chemical reaction to function in a similar manner, even if not designed to function by explosion. The use of explosives is the most commonly employed tactic of terrorist organizations worldwide.

Figure 6. Explosive Incident.



The Planning and Response Incident Fulcrum (Figure 7). Planning and response are the keys to success. This handbook uses the phrase WMD threat planning and response to encompass three distinct planes.

A broad timeline: Preparation begins well before any incident and continues until recovery measures have been completed. Thus, the spectrum includes both pre-incident and post-incident planning and execution timelines (the incident is the fulcrum dividing pre- and post-incident planning and response, thus the descriptive title).

A broad range of threats: All terrorist WMD threats, particularly the nontraditional, emerging asymmetrical threats, must be recognized as credible threats and planned for accordingly.

Planning and response actions: Cross-functional, fully integrated planning and response is necessary, if an installation is to focus its response and ensure successful reaction to an incident

Figure 7. The WMD Threat Planning and Response Incident Fulcrum.



USAF Leadership Queries for WMD Threat Planning and Response.

Recent terrorist incidents offer indications that the USAF should expect the use of unconventional, asymmetric means to threaten USAF personnel, their families, and installations and equipment worldwide. To proactively respond to the threat, USAF senior leadership set forth five key questions to assess USAF response capability. These questions can be tailored to meet planning needs at the installation level.

Does current USAF policy, doctrine, guidance, and planning adequately focus and address the Air Forces's WMD threat planning and response requirements for installation-level commanders, planners, and responders?

Are USAF personnel educated, and are they and their families aware of the magnitude of the terrorist WMD threat at their installation?

Is the USAF properly staffed, organized, and equipped to respond effectively to the terrorist WMD threat at USAF installations worldwide?

Are USAF training and exercises focused and sufficient to prepare installations to respond effectively to incidents that may result from the terrorist WMD threat?

Does the USAF have a focused assessment methodology and a viable inspection program applicable to the range of terrorist WMD threats for your installation?

The USAF goal is to protect USAF personnel, materiel, and facilities from the potential terrorist WMD threat. Because this responsibility falls on the installation commander, these questions must be tailored to assist installation planners. Among the key considerations providing foundational support in an installation's planning efforts are:

Policy, doctrine, manual, and instructional guidance.

Awareness.

Manning/Personnel Readiness.

Organization.

- Equipping.
- Training.
- Exercising.
- Assessing.
- Inspecting.


Strategy-to-Task and the WMD Threat Planning and Response Tree.

The analytic foundation of this handbook is based on a strategy-to-task approach. This approach is a common USAF analytic tool and planning methodology used to develop the USAF WMD Threat Planning and Response Tree (see Figure 8). As previously stated, the USAF goal in response to acts of terrorism is to protect USAF personnel, materiel and facilities from the potential terrorist WMD threat. As illustrated on the tree, there are eight operational tasks (depicted horizontally on the tree) to accomplish this goal. Each operational task encompasses several enabling tasks (depicted vertically on the tree). These enabling tasks highlight the general activities that make it possible to accomplish the mission-essential tasks.

NOTE: Functional tasks are the discrete events or actions necessary to carry out the overall goal. These tasks are contained in the functional checklists in Part B of this handbook.

Since this handbook uses this tree to provide the framework for installation WMD threat planning and response, references will be made to the tree throughout the handbook to assist in overall planning efforts. Planners are encouraged to refer to the tree throughout the planning process so as not to overlook a critical planning or execution element. Definitions for the operational and enabling tasks appear in the Glossary.

Figure 8. WMD Threat Planning and Response Tree.



USAF Threat Response Pillars. This handbook's planning and response foundation rests, whenever possible, on existing HAZMAT/emergency response capabilities, with a clear focus on the emerging terrorist WMD threat. While the phases of response—notification, response, withdrawal and recovery—are appropriate for HAZMAT operations and major accidents, this handbook establishes a paradigm for response to a terrorist WMD incident/attack. This paradigm shift views a potential incident in three phases: pre-incident, incident, and post-incident, emphasizing pre-incident planning across the installation functional areas for efficient incident and post-incident response.

The eight operational tasks of the WMD Threat Planning and Response Tree encompass the three response phases—pre-incident, incident, and post-incident—providing for enhanced planning and response for a terrorist WMD incident/attack. Within these phases, all installations should be able to effectively mitigate the threat and continue mission critical activities, either through containment of the threat or by relocating the mission to an alternate operating location, so as to minimize mission disruption. (These actions are more fully defined and described below.) Currently every Air Force installation may not be adequately resourced, or technology may not be available to implement all enabling tasks to successfully meet the USAF goal. However, all installations should identify the resources necessary to reduce, prevent, respond to, and recover from a terrorist WMD incident/attack.

This handbook establishes the following USAF threat response pillars (Figure 9) as they relate to terrorist WMD threat planning and response. Each installation must:

Each installation should plan, train, organize, equip, and be prepared to execute a WMD response to detect, assess, contain, and recover essential resources, protect personnel and continue the mission.

Figure 9. USAF WMD Threat Response Pillars.



1. Be able to detect, assess, contain and recover in the event of a terrorist WMD incident, without significantly impacting its warfighting capabilities.
2. Use its planning team to assess or expand its current HAZMAT emergency response capabilities to include all functional area responsibilities and the terrorist WMD threat (it is important to note that response to a biological incident may not fall under traditional HAZMAT response).
3. Ensure that pre- and post-incident terrorist WMD threat response measures are adequately planned, and personnel are properly trained and exercised.

4. Ensure that pre- and post-incident terrorist WMD Threat response measures are cross-functionally linked.

The pillars are necessary to accomplish the USAF goal. Pillars 1 to 4 are achievable through a focused and unified effort on behalf of installation commanders, planners, staff, and responders. While tasks included in Pillar 2 may stem from existing HAZMAT/disaster response capabilities, these capabilities alone cannot sufficiently be relied upon to address the terrorist WMD threat. All installations should provide, or arrange for, the capability (memorandum of agreement (MOA), memorandum of understanding (MOU), SOFA, etc.) to: *detect* a WMD device and identify the incident by type; *assess* its potential effect on the base populace and local community; *contain* the incident; and begin initial steps toward *recovery*. Note that the installation's response to other terrorist threats (snipers, hostages, kidnapping, WMD, barricading, or similar events) should be described in the Installation Security Plan 31-1 and be in accordance with AFI 32-210, *AT/FP Program Standards*.

Each installation should plan, train, organize, equip, and be prepared to execute a minimum baseline response (using the detect-assess-contain – recover critical actions) to address emerging terrorist WMD threats. That minimum baseline capability includes the following:

Detect

Detection includes pre-incident actions and incident actions.

Active detection encompasses those pre-incident protective and *defensive* measures taken by an installation. These proactive, disaster preparedness measures help installations mitigate the likelihood and severity of an incident.

Initial response detection begins with the aware observer who reports a potential incident. (Note that the notification phase operational task is encompassed in this step.)

Detection continues with the initial response element. The initial response element should have a continuous (24 hours a day, 7 days a week) initial detection capability (Figure 10) that encompasses all terrorist WMD threats. The initial response detection capability includes :

Figure 10. Example Detection Capability (CAM and M22 ACAA).



Manual Detection Systems:

- M8 and M9 Paper
- DOD Biological Sampling Kits
- Explosive Detection Dogs (EDD)
- M256A1 Chemical Detection Kit
- M272 Water Test Kit
- M18A2 Chemical Detector Kit

Automatic Detection Systems:

- M22 Automatic Chemical Agent Alarms (ACAA)
- M8A1 Automatic Detectors
- Chemical Agent Monitors
- Radiation Detection and Computation equipment
- Rugged Automated Pathogen Identification Device (RAPID)

Initially, these assets may or may not be provided to each installation however the ultimate goal is to equip all installations . If provided,

ensure that all installations can meet the minimum requirement to detect an event, in order to reduce the impact of a worst-case incident. Detecting a covert biological event is discussed in “**Recognizing That a Biological Incident Has Occurred.**”

If the first responder’s initial detection capabilities are exceeded, the responder will follow the procedures outlined in the Full Spectrum Threat Response Plan to request the additional resources of the installation’s HAZMAT response team or other installation follow-on elements (or contracted resource), or the nearest available resource.

Assess

The response continues with an *initial evaluation* to quickly determine the scope of the incident and level of response required.

Although assessment is a continual process that does not end until recovery is complete, the initial assessment task encompasses:

Immediate notification of the HAZMAT response team, installation command and control nodes, USAF community, families, and local or host nation civilian community if the initial report indicates that it is warranted. (During a biological event, agent identification may occur some time after the actual event.)

Evaluation of the problem (type of incident, probable size of the incident, physical or environmental conditions or impacts).

Evaluation and selection of response options, selection of an appropriate response strategy, and establishment of response objectives (based on each installation’s organic capability).

Determination of a hot zone for each WMD incident. Each incident requires a different systematic search pattern.

Contain

Assessment is based largely on the responders' experience and ability to look at and address the situation; containment actively implements the response the assessment indicated as most appropriate.

The standard for all installations should be maintaining the minimum response capability required to reduce or isolate an incident in order to mitigate or prevent further risk or damage to persons, materiel, facilities, and the environment (figure 11). Containment may not be possible or necessary during a biological incident.

Each installation's containment capability begins with the existing HAZMAT emergency response team's capability, but must be expanded to meet the minimum baseline containment capability.

Responders should take every precaution possible to preserve evidence after a terrorist event. This evidence will be crucial in the investigation, arrest, and conviction of the perpetrator(s) and should come second only to preservation of life, limb and property.

Figure 11. Containment Operation.



Recover

Proper response during an incident is key to recovery to ensure continuation of the USAF's strategic force-projection mission.

Recovery is a logical extension of the initial steps taken in the containment task.

Recovery operations may quickly exceed an installation's capability.

Installation planners should address and incorporate recovery operations in all applicable installation plans.

NOTE: If outsourced or contracted for, the installation's response capability should meet the USAF baseline standard. Installations may be lacking in equipment, training, and technology; however, they must be able to sustain an initial response based on the existing, baseline capabilities described in this section until additional assistance (DoD or national assets) can be mobilized.


Planning and Response: Key Players (Figure 12). To accomplish an effective response, this handbook recommends using the structure and terminology common to other base response plans. The Air Force should use the installation Disaster Response Force (DRF) to maintain command and control in responding to a terrorist WMD incident/attack. The DRF consists of the designated installation command post, the Disaster Control Group (DCG), the Initial Response Element (IRE), Follow-On Elements (FOE), Unit Control Centers (UCC), and any support and recovery teams—HAZMAT, EOD, or Shelter Management Teams—inherent to the installation.

The installation commander normally operates out of the designated installation command post. The command post is responsible for controlling all activities so the installation can support taskings or requests from the incident site and keep higher headquarters informed. It serves as the command

and control element that provides guidance, both directive and nondirective, on support and operational procedures for the installation's WMD response and serves as the focal point for basewide notification.

The DCG provides on-scene command, control, communications, and functional expertise for military resources. The DCG will normally consist of the On-Scene Commander (OSC) and designated functional area representatives. The wing or installation commander will determine the specific configuration of the DCG based on the situation. The OSC is the designated representative of the installation commander. Typically the support group commander assumes this role and responds to the scene while the installation commander directs activities from the designated installation command post. The DCG members coordinate operations and support requirements with their unit control centers and provide liaison with mutual-aid response elements. The UCC's provide a focal point within the installation to monitor unit resources and mission capability and to coordinate activities during a response.

Figure 12. Planning and Response: Key Installation Players and Nodes.



The IRE is responsible for initially responding to the incident site during a terrorist WMD situation. The security forces will contain and/or neutralize any hostile forces in the areas before a response can begin. The Senior Fire Official (SFO) then assumes control of the incident site until the installation commander's designated OSC arrives. After any hostile force actions, necessary fire suppression and casualty evacuation, an Initial Entry Team (IET) will enter the site for full assessment of the situation. The IET is led by EOD (or equivalent) for all real or suspect WMD incident/attacks. The DCG and designated OSC may or may not be physically located at the incident site, depending on the situation as reported by the SFO.

The above information may seem intuitive to some, but remember that while designated OSCs and senior officers have years of experience in leadership positions, they may be unfamiliar with emergency response operations. Few USAF personnel have personal experience with a WMD situation in the context of a terrorist incident; therefore, OSCs must rely on the first responders and their expertise in providing recommendations.

Installation Response Parameters. Any terrorist WMD incident/attack is unlikely to result in an "installation-only" response, and could evolve into one of the following scenarios:

- On-base only
- On-base, extending off-base
- Off-base, extending on-base
- Off-base only

This handbook details the on-base installation response, which serves as the basis for the other response scenarios (appropriate notifications and authorizations are obtained for off-base response). Specific guidance is found in DoD Directive 3025.1, *Military Support to Civil Authorities* and implemented by AFI 10-802, *Military Support to Civil Authorities*.




EVALUATING THE INSTALLATION RESPONSE CAPABILITY

Introduction. To ensure maximum response effectiveness, planning for terrorist WMD threat response must begin long before an incident occurs. Initial planning should be based on the local WMD threat assessment and terrorist intentions and capabilities. Consider both the local and postulated threat in planning. Local emergency response planning guidance can be found in AFI 10-2501, *Full Spectrum Threat Response Planning and Operations*. The threat assessment should be continuously updated and disseminated. The installation should then tailor its response capability to the installation's mission and the specific threat assessment. Planning the response to an incident should include a task assessment, designation of the functional area to perform each task, identification of installation response capabilities, shortfalls, additional resources, and funding requirements. This section highlights key considerations for establishing a baseline response capability (see Table 1). Assessing an installations' response capability is portrayed graphically in figure 13.

Table 1. Steps in Establishing an Installation Response Capability.

Identify installation resources available to respond to a WMD incident/attack.
Assess shortfalls between installation resources and the HQ AFCESA Baseline Data Assessment Equipment List
Identify mutual aid or host nation resources, including available contracted services to supplement the installation response.
Assess overall capability (installation plus local or host nation support, and contracted support.)
Assess requirements beyond the HQ AFCESA Baseline Data Assessment Equipment List.
Determine shortfalls; report major deficiencies to higher headquarters.

Figure 13. Assessing Response Capabilities.

Identify Installation Resources. The first step in assessing capabilities is to conduct a detailed inventory of existing response resources and organizations, including equipment and trained teams and personnel. Using this inventory, each functional area should determine its ability to respond effectively to terrorist WMD incidents, using the WMD Threat Planning and Response Tree, the WMD Incident Master Checklist, the WMD Decision Tree, and the functional area checklists as a guide.

NOTE: The execution checklists are not exhaustive, but should be used as guidelines. Installations should develop installation specific checklists to address unique requirements, resources and capabilities.

Assess Installation's Shortfalls in Resources Using Recommended WMD Equipment List. As described in the USAF WMD Threat Response Pillars (figure 9), the installation response planning ensures, *at a minimum*, that each USAF installation—regardless of its mission—is capable of detecting, assessing, containing and initiating recovery actions (within its capability) necessary to resume operations following a terrorist WMD incident.

Once the commander has determined the installation's initial equipment capabilities required for terrorist WMD threat response, those capabilities must be compared to the current Recommended WMD Equipment. To facilitate the installations' overall assessment, list shortfalls in categories that are standardized across functions.

Identify Mutual Aid or Host Nation Resources. If the installation's response capabilities fall short of the Recommended WMD Equipment List, the installation should analyze what resources could be made available under MOA or MOU. An installation can augment its resources through cooperation with local or regional agencies, other nearby USAF and DoD resources, or host nation resources. These additional support elements might include HAZMAT teams, fire departments, emergency medical services, public health offices, law enforcement agencies, environmental agencies, and contracted response and remediation companies. All installation MOA/MOUs should comply with and be approved under the guidance described in AFI 25-201, *Support Agreements*.

Assess Overall Capability. The commander should assess the installation's overall capability across the functional areas by considering both installation resources and augmented capabilities attained through MOA/MOUs. The combination of these resources should assist the installation in more closely achieving the minimum response capability.

Determine Requirements Beyond the Minimum Response Level. For some installations, however, merely ensuring capabilities at the minimum response level will be insufficient. The commander may wish to implement a higher standard of response capability based in part on:

- Criticality of the installation's mission in the event of a conflict.
- Sensitivity of the installation's location.
- Proximity of the installation to vulnerable or essential population or assets.
- Inaccessibility of mutual aid or host nation support.

Determine Shortfalls; Report Deficiencies to Higher Headquarters.

When weaknesses or shortfalls are identified, the installation commander should prioritize resource requests and submit them to higher headquarters for consideration for future funding. Because it is unlikely that resource requests will be immediately addressed, installations will often respond with resources on hand. As such, planning should be based on the resources that are currently available.



IMPLEMENTING THE PLANNED RESPONSE

Actions taken in the early minutes of the response to a terrorist incident are critical to success or failure
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Introduction. Deterring a terrorist WMD incident/attack should be a primary goal of any installation (see the Installation AT/FP Plan). The planning committee or working group designated by the installation commander will oversee all the operational pre-incident tasks—defense, response, and recovery planning; education and awareness; training and exercising; resourcing; and assessment and inspection.

While planning and preparation will prove to be essential elements of a successful, timely response, this section will assist in developing the heart of the installation's plan—response to an incident. This section is geared toward providing key considerations and background for commanders and their staffs to ensure a smooth response. It provides enough response details to ensure that commanders and their staffs have a clear view of the response process. It does not, however, provide first responder detail. For that level of understanding, this handbook provides the functional area checklists in Part B.

NOTE: Some of the general details do not specifically follow functional area instructional documents; that is intentional. The guide began with the understanding that a response to most WMD incidents would grow from existing USAF HAZMAT emergency response capability. From there, it bridges the gaps between each of the key response functional areas. This section depicts a complete, structured response and fills in the relevant existing doctrinal and instructional gaps.

This section focuses on a basic framework of response to any WMD incident/attack. To address the nuances of the particular WMD incident/attack at hand, responders must be able to interpret the incident indicators as they appear, and tailor the response appropriately. To facilitate this process, Part B of this handbook features WMD threat-specific “If/Then” Decision Trees and associated “indicators”. The following incident walk-through will address three operational tasks: notification, initial response, and continuing response. Special caveats particular to a biological incident will be discussed in the section titled “Recognizing That a Biological Incident Has Occurred”.

The Notification Operational Task. Notification begins when a report of the WMD incident/attack arrives at a link in the notification chain, whether it be the control tower, fire department, emergency room, security forces, or command post. All installation personnel should notify the proper authorities of a suspected terrorist incident. Typically, installations will use the primary and/or secondary crash nets to notify fire, medical, security forces, and the remainder of the DCG. This topic is discussed in greater detail in the section titled “The Notification and Resource Activation Process”.

NOTE: See the Notification and Resource Activation flow charts for a visual representation of the Notification Process in figures 17 and 18.

The Initial Response Operational Task. The initial response phase begins when the Initial Response Element (IRE) which consist of firefighters, security forces, and medical responders and in some cases EOD. These forces deploy to the scene of the incident. These initial or first responders must approach the incident area with care, to avoid becoming victims themselves. They must be cognizant of warning signs indicating the presence of lethal agents or potential hazards; they must be aware WMD incidents may be masked by a hostage situation, disgruntled employees, protests, or accidents. In the case hostile forces are present, the senior security officer will retain on-scene command until the threat is

neutralized or until command is relinquished to civilian law enforcement agencies or host nation forces. The Senior Fire Official (SFO) determines the parameters of the incident site hot and warm zones and provides command and control of the immediate incident site itself. Direct control of the hot zone is delegated to another designated fire officer. The OSC or the installation commander's designated representative provides command and control of the entire incident scene, including hot, warm, and cold zones.

The first responders will approach the incident site from an upwind or crosswind direction, maintaining a safe distance from the site. If there is confirmation that no victims are involved, the SFO may conduct detection, and simply cordon off the area to conduct decontamination operations. However, the likelihood of victims is extremely high when dealing with a terrorist incident. The SFO will assume control of the incident site, as firefighters are typically the only functional experts specifically trained, qualified, and equipped to operate in the incident site. Regardless of the nature of the situation, the incident site must be treated as a crime scene.

Per Presidential Decision Directive 39, 21 June 1995, the Department of Justice, through the FBI, is the lead federal agency for crisis management during a WMD event within the U.S., its territories and possessions, the District of Columbia, and other places subject to US jurisdiction. The Department of State (DoS) will have the lead in a WMD event against a US installation in a foreign country. Expect these departments involvement during a terrorist incident.

If WMD materials are suspected or detected, the installation commander will ensure that appropriate notification and reporting requirements are accomplished. While the FBI or DoS may assume jurisdiction for the investigation, the installation commander must provide the initial and immediate response to any incident occurring on the installation in order to isolate and contain the incident. In all cases, command of military elements remains within military channels.

The installation command post will activate the DRF. Response at the incident site should be initially limited to the IRE; severity of the incident may dictate that the DCG and OSC remain located some distance away. The SFO/OSC may request follow-on elements from the various functional areas, depending on the situation. The DCG will assemble at a pre-designated location. The assembly point for the OSC and DCG should be at a safe distance from the incident site to prevent interference with the IRE and to reduce exposure of DCG members to unnecessary hazards. While not all DCG members may be required in the early phases of the response, they can provide valuable advice and assistance in the myriad of ongoing tasks and begin coordinating for follow-on resources if needed. The DCG members should review both their individual DCG checklists and their functional area responder checklists to begin thinking about what needs to be done immediately and what may be needed in the future. In a potential WMD environment, OSCs should limit the number of additional personnel responding to or near the incident site (other than those requested by the SFO).

The OSC must rely on the SFO to make an accurate determination as to when it is prudent to relinquish command to the OSC. This may be when all initial emergency actions are completed and the SFO feels it safe for the OSC and DCG to move toward the incident perimeter. The SFO will evaluate the situation and determine whether it is safe and practical for the OSC or anyone to proceed closer.

The IRE will begin determining the nature of the incident. If no detection capability exists, the IRE must be prepared to continue response operations until such time as a DoD team or other coordinated support with detection capability arrive at the installation. When follow-on forces are required, the IRE will remain on-site to alert them to the extent and characteristics of the incident.

The IRE will begin establishing the incident site. The initial stages of incident response will proceed slowly due to the technical nature and the potential hazards of various WMD incidents. A large number of responders may be required to mitigate this type of emergency, which also requires personnel to proceed with extreme caution to ensure their safety in planning an appropriate response. When first responders lack resources necessary or must await the arrival of properly trained personnel, specialized response equipment or vehicles, and numerous support personnel, delays will be inevitable.

Initiate Protective Measures. If there are suspected indications of a WMD incident/attack and the presence of hazardous agents, qualified first responders will use the appropriate level of protective gear. Without protective clothing and breathing apparatus, any additional personnel entering the affected area may become casualties themselves. Most agents will penetrate ordinary clothing, and standard protective clothing and masks may afford protection against only some agents, in which case efforts to rescue personnel will result in responder contamination.

Identify and Contain the Threat Area. Before any rescuers enter the hot zone, the SFO/OSC will determine the cordon size based on the presence or suspected presence of hazardous agents by type (see the cordon standards in Part B). The security forces (SF) then establish the cordon perimeter based on the OSC's recommendations. They will control access to the site by establishing an entry control point (ECP), serving as the sole entrance and exit from the incident site. The SF will also control the ECP and allow only those with verified authorization by the OSC to enter the site. In accordance with AFMAN 32-4004 (being replaced by AFMAN 10-2503), the SF will establish ECP procedures to control access and egress from affected areas (i.e. establishing entry authorization lists, checking identification cards, badging when possible, etc.). The firefighters will establish decontamination lanes (for both victims and responders); the lanes must be staffed by adequate numbers of qualified personnel.

Medical personnel treat and transport patients field decontaminated by firefighters and provide on-scene medical support to the responders, such as ensuring that personnel donning entry suits receive pre-entry physical screening. Civil Engineer (CE) should ensure that steps are taken to protect critical systems (for example, public utilities and medical facilities) to preclude further damage. The OSC will establish and maintain communications between the incident site and the installation command post (or DCG, if established) to transmit the most up-to-date information, forming an accurate picture for the wing leadership and response forces. Responders should begin stabilizing the incident and limiting its impact.

NOTE: Terrorists may execute several incidents in quick succession. Initial responders must be aware of these tactics and alert to the possibility for the use of secondary devices, not only when arriving at the incident site, but also throughout the response phase, until they can conduct a thorough search of the area.

Identify the Threat Agent. First responders must have agent detection capability that will allow them the ability to identify specific threats. Trained personnel and response equipment or vehicles should be standing by, while the IRE establishes the incident site. First responders may have been able to make preliminary identification of agents used in the incident, but if the test results were negative or ambiguous, more sensitive detection methods may be employed for an accurate threat assessment. Once the incident site is established, trained detection teams will gather additional information through the employment of specialized detection equipment and methods. Biological and unknown chemical agent samples will be evacuated through controlled channels to a laboratory facility for definitive identification. Specific chain of custody, packaging, and marking requirements apply to all items removed from the scene. If the detection capability does not exist or is not adequate for the incident at hand, the IRE must be prepared to continue response operations until a DoD team or other coordinated support can arrive at the installation. If follow-on forces are required, the IRE will remain on-site to alert them to the extent and characteristics of the incident.

Predict the Effects. A hazard prediction will be conducted based on the type of agent and weather conditions. Weather operations are critical to effectively predicting the hazard areas. The hazard prediction should identify HAZMATs, complete hazards analysis (plume or oil spill modeling), resource management, and assist emergency management. The HAZMAT emergency planning team should compare the software capabilities against the required information for hazards identification, vulnerability analysis, risk analysis, capabilities assessment, and plan development to ensure that the software enhances the HAZMAT emergency planning team's capabilities. Existing and emerging software programs can be used to assist in the identification and warning processes. In responding to a terrorist WMD incident/attack, first responders must be able to provide critical resources within the first few minutes to contain and mitigate the effects of the incident. After the SFO's initial size-up of the situation, additional local responders may be requested. Maintaining mutual aid agreements with the local civilian community is a key component of a viable installation response capability.

If the DCG is present at the incident site, the DCG functional representatives will coordinate with their local counterparts to activate resources in accordance with pre-established MOA/MOUs. If the DCG is not present, the SFO will request activation of resources through the installation command post. If it appears that the incident will exceed the base and local resource capabilities, it may be necessary to appeal for assistance at higher levels. Structures are in place within the DoD and at the national level to respond to WMD incident/attacks. (See figures 26 and 27 for procedural highlights.) National-level responders (such as FEMA, DoE, or WMD Civil Support Teams) may not be immediately accessible or available to respond to an installation's needs. Therefore, each installation must plan for a large-scale WMD incident/attack by focusing its response for each functional area, based on its organic resources and mutual aid (local support). The installation must be prepared to conduct not only the initial response, but also sustained response operations until additional assets can be notified and deployed to the site.

Protect the Base and the Community. If it is apparent that the incident will affect a portion of the base populace or local community, the OSC should initiate procedures to warn, advise, or evacuate personnel. The designated installation command post can activate the “Giant Voice” or similar base notification procedures and contact the proper civilian authorities. The installation commander should implement Terrorist Force Protection Condition (FPCON) measures as appropriate.

Avoid Contamination. Every effort must be made to avoid further contamination of first responders and the base populace. As a result of the plume analysis, the OSC, with the assistance of the BE and weather representatives, may be able to predict what area must be evacuated to avoid further contamination. The security forces will carry out the evacuation procedures but will at no time enter the hazard area unless they have the appropriate Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE). Weather conditions may change or winds may shift, requiring movement of the cordon/ECP and resulting in the evacuation of affected areas.

Conduct Emergency Decontamination of Responders and Patients. Firefighters must establish a decontamination lane to process responders, contaminated casualties, and contaminated, but uninjured persons (Figure 14). All responders must remember if they are inside the cordon and are contaminated, they must be decontaminated before receiving any necessary medical treatment. The senior medical representative should set up a patient identification and tracking system. Information should be relayed to the receiving medical treatment facility if a patient enroute is suspected of not being fully decontaminated at the incident site. In addition, notify local MTF's of the possibility of contaminated ambulatory patients arriving at their facility and the type of contaminant to expect. Arrangements should then be made to perform a more thorough decontamination of patients at the medical facility, if necessary. The SFO/OSC will determine the requirement for vehicle and equipment decontamination (Figure 15) and recommend to the installation commander, activation of decontamination teams, as necessary, according to the Full Spectrum Threat Response

Plan 10-2. Long-term decontamination is addressed in the Recovery section.


Figure 14. Personnel Decontamination.



Figure 15. Vehicle Decontamination.

The Continuing Response Operational Task. This operational task includes the following enabling and functional tasks, all of which may require the use of a USAF installation's follow-on assets. This highlights the criticality of establishing MOA/MOUs with the local community during the pre-incident planning phase. Coordination with the local elements improves the response times and offers the opportunity to share critical resources needed to mitigate the effects of an incident.

Site Management Operations. The OSC will assemble the functional areas upwind from the incident site, outside the contamination control line. (See Figure 16 for setup of the cordon perimeter, hot/warm/cold zones, decontamination lanes, and assembly areas.) Site management should include a means to maintain rapid accountability for each member engaged in activities at the incident site. The procedures should include a means to specifically identify and keep track of members entering and leaving the hot zone and any area where special protective equipment is required.

Figure 16. Site Management Operations.

In the event Federal civil authorities assume command of the scene, the installation and local responders must be prepared to efficiently and properly transfer command (see the OSC Checklist in Part B of this handbook for additional information). These actions will best ensure the safety of responders on the scene and continued operations to best protect the health and safety of both responders and the general public.

Casualty Management. Medical Services will provide emergency medical response at the incident site, including lifesaving medical care and support for responders. Issuing of chemical-biological agent pretreatment drugs, prophylaxis medication, and antidotes will be determined based on type of incident and availability. Ideally, when medically appropriate, patients should be decontaminated before leaving the scene. However, if decontamination is incomplete, or if contaminated persons leave the scene voluntarily, the receiving medical facility (military or civilian) must be prepared to decontaminate these patients. Once the medical facility is notified of a WMD incident/attack, all medical facility personnel engaged in the response should be notified of the nature of the emergency and the type of suspected contamination. The medical facility should equip all neces-

sary personnel with appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) and prepare to accomplish any additional decontamination as necessary.

NOTE: Many Air Force installations no longer have in-patient medical facilities or 24-hour operations. Civilian hospitals *may not* accept “contaminated” patients. These issues need to be addressed in MOAs/MOUs with the host nation or local community.

Commanders must arrange to have designated patient decontamination areas, equipment, and supplies for facilities identified (both primary and alternate) as receiving patients in the unit’s Medical Contingency Response Plan (MCRP). Bio-Environmental Engineers, Public Health, facility management, and emergency services staffs, will assist the medical unit commander in determining the most appropriate location(s) for a medical facility’s decontamination area. Although areas dedicated solely to decontamination need not be set aside, medical facilities must take appropriate precautions to prevent the spread of contamination to other areas within the facility. Decontamination will be performed in areas that minimize any spread of contamination to personnel or equipment. An alternative to an indoor decontamination area would be an outside or portable facility such as wading pools or outdoor showers, along with bags for disposal of contaminated clothes. Plans and provisions must be made for managing patients’ personal effects.

Airborne contaminants may be transported via the medical facility’s ventilation system. Therefore, ventilation in the decontamination area must be separate from the ventilation system for the rest of the facility. Morgues, with an isolated ventilation system are often used as decontamination rooms. If a contaminated victim is emitting airborne contaminants and the ventilation in the decontamination room is not self-contained, the ventilation system in the decontamination area should be turned off. (Not all chemicals will be volatile enough to cause off-gassing). Because medical personnel and patients could be at risk, ambient air should be monitored using instruments, and the plan should provide means of supplementary or auxiliary ventilation.

Control the Incident Site. SF should maintain the incident site as a crime scene until relieved by the applicable investigative element (OSI or FBI). Physical evidence is often the most reliable, and serves a crucial part in connecting the perpetrator to the scene. No evidence, including a confession, is incontestable. It is everyone's responsibility to protect classified information, especially owners/users. The OSC, in conjunction with the security forces, should determine procedures for securing classified materials.

Contain Contaminated Material. The primary objective is to ensure that the incident does not extend beyond the cordoned area. The installation's populace should be notified to ensure that it takes proper precautions. It may be necessary to shelter the population in place rather than risk further danger. This entails ensuring ventilation systems, doors, and windows are airtight.

Implement Continued Shared Response. Each installation needs to have the knowledge and ability to contact and receive assistance from DoD specialized teams such as the WMD Civil Support Teams, and the Technical Escort Unit. Therefore, the following section is dedicated to the notification and activation of resources to affect a continued response.



THE NOTIFICATION AND RESOURCE ACTIVATION PROCESS

An Introduction to the Notification and Resource Activation Process.

In the event of a terrorist WMD incident/attack, the installation should conduct the following complementary sets of actions:

- Activate the installation's initial response elements and local MOA/MOUs.
- Initiate the notification process.
- Request resources to augment the installation's response capabilities.

Terrorist WMD incidents—or threats of terrorist acts—may overwhelm an installation's minimum capability to adequately detect, assess, or contain the threat. The USAF and DoD—like most other local, state, or Federal entities—have neither the authority nor the expertise to respond unilaterally to all aspects of terrorist WMD threats or acts. Federal Response Plan doctrine provides help in developing an installation's response based on crisis and consequence management.

Crisis Management—includes those response measures required to identify, acquire, and plan the use of all resources needed to anticipate, prevent, or resolve a threat or act of terrorism; it is primarily a law enforcement response which focuses on the criminal aspects of the incident.

Consequence Management—includes those response measures required to protect the health and safety of USAF personnel and families, and to maintain or to restore the capability to continue the USAF's strategic force projection mission.

The FBI, as the Lead Federal Agency (LFA), will assume the crisis management role in the U.S., its territories and possessions, or other places that have US jurisdiction; DoS will assume the crisis management role in foreign countries. The Federal Response Plan or the appropriate Federal agencies will be activated as required by the National Command Authority. There is also the option for the state's governor to activate the National Guard to support response efforts. Once the FBI or DoS assumes control of the terrorist WMD incident/attack, the OSC responds to the FBI or DoS but remains in command of USAF personnel and resources.

One of the most significant challenges facing an installation is the potential delay in obtaining additional DoD or national assistance. Therefore, each installation must know and understand how to contact and receive assistance from USG or DoD specialized teams such as the Technical Escort Unit (TEU). There is a USG/DoD hierarchical relationship and a notification/resource activation process. Therefore, an understanding of the notification and resource activation process is critical. A description of the process and a list of some response assets follow.

Implementing the Planned Response section of this handbook highlighted the likely need for both installation and local resources for initial response. As first responders initially assess the incident and make a determination that the magnitude will overwhelm all base and local resources, the installation may deem it necessary to appeal for assistance from higher levels. To assist installations in responding to a terrorist WMD incident/attack, this section provides a notification process and a list of available resources. The Responders' Tools section of this handbook provides the following information on resources: descriptions/capabilities of the resources, their location, and their expected response time; and telephone numbers for informational purposes only (not for activation purposes).

Notification and Resource Activation Process—Domestic WMD Incidents. Consult figure 17 for a visual representation of this process. In accordance with CJCSM 3150.03, *Joint Reporting Structure Event and Incident Reports*, the installation will submit an OPREP-3 report where national-level interest has been determined. Therefore, in the event of a terrorist WMD incident/attack, the installation will send an OPREP-3 (flagword PINNACLE) directly to the National Military Command Center (NMCC). The goal is to make initial voice reports within 15 minutes of an incident, with message report submitted within 1 hour of the incident. The initial report must not be delayed to gain additional information. Follow-up reports can be submitted as additional information becomes available.


Voice Reports. The installation will submit voice reports sequentially to the NMCC, appropriate CINCs, and the reporting unit's parent service and intermediate superior command. Conference calls or concurrent telephone calls should be considered if no delays are encountered and security can be maintained. A line will remain open between the NMCC and the installation throughout the duration of the incident.

NMCC telephone numbers are:

DSN Primary:	851-3840
DSN Secondary:	725-3530
DSN Tertiary:	227-6340
Commercial:	703-521-1014
Washington Switch:	703-697-1201
Drop:	DSN 312-1048/1049/1050/1051

Communications Reports. Submit OPREP-3 reports IMMEDIATE or FLASH precedence as soon as possible after an event or incident has occurred. Message Address: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3 NMCC//

Figure 17. Notification and Resource Activation Process—Domestic WMD.



Resources Available Through the NMCC.

Chemical Biological Rapid Response Team (CBRRT).
 USA Technical Escort Unit (TEU).
 U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense (USAMRICD).
 U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID).
 Naval Medical Research Institute (NMRI).
 Naval Research Laboratory (NRL).
 Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM).
 Air Force Radiation Assessment Team (AFRAT).
 Director of Military Support (DOMS).

The following civilian resources are available:

- Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
- The United State Public Health Service (USPHS)
(Office of Emergency Preparedness).
- The Department of Energy (DoE).
- The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
- The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
- The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI).

Assets available from the installation level: (Recommend the installation coordinate with next higher headquarters or an approved means of conducting direct liaison with these elements.)

- Hammer Adaptive Communications Element (Hammer ACE)
- Civil Air Patrol (CAP)


Notification and Resource Activation Process—Foreign WMD Incidents. Consult figure 18 for a visual representation of this process. Oversight and management of a WMD incident/attack on an Air Force installation in a foreign country differs from the process outlined in the above paragraph in the following manner.

Commander-in-Chief (CINC): The CINC is responsible for managing the event. However, should the incident require greater resources, the CINC may need to request additional assistance from the US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM).

CINCUSJFCOM has the responsibility to support US installations in foreign countries to augment limited resources. USJFCOM has access to resources and specialized units from each of the four Services to augment assistance in the event of a terrorist WMD incident/attack.

For WMD incidents that occur on Air Force installations in foreign countries, the DoS is the lead Federal agency for both crisis management and consequence management responsibilities.

Figure 18. Notification and Resource Activation Process—Foreign WMD.



Air Force installation commanders located in foreign countries should establish Host Nation (HN) agreements to address the use of installation security forces, other military forces, and host-nation resources that clearly delineate jurisdictional limits. The agreements will likely evolve into the installation having responsibility “inside the wire or installation perimeter” and the HN having responsibility “outside the wire or installation perimeter.” Exceptions may exist, due to the wide dispersal of work and housing areas, utilities, and other installation support mechanisms that require the installation to be responsible for certain areas outside of the installation perimeter.



RECOVERY

Introduction. The recovery phase begins when the immediate hazards are contained. This phase may be delayed due to factors such as the extent and severity of the incident and the ongoing investigation efforts by the FBI/OSI.

Depending upon the nature of the WMD incident/attack, extensive damage, mass casualties and contaminated areas could result. Significant recovery operations would be required, as well as outside assistance. During this phase, it is necessary to obtain additional information about the incident, and to develop and carry out a recovery plan. The OSC has primary responsibility to approve all recovery actions and will develop a recovery plan to be approved by the installation commander.

During the recovery phase, access to the site will be granted by the appropriate office of primary responsibility. All personnel entering the site will be accounted for and properly protected and briefed on the hazards and emergency withdrawal procedures. Site access authority and custody of wreckage and other physical evidence may be relinquished to the Department of Justice (DOJ) FBI Team Chief by the OSC when the scene is considered safe. Additionally, supporting DCG assets needed for follow-on investigative support must be requested through the OSC.

Post-recovery may be difficult to completely achieve. For example, the commander may have to consider burning contaminated material. Complex systems, made of various materials that absorb contaminants, may not be able to be decontaminated. These same materials may also not be transportable because of their inherent public health risk.

A number of critical enabling tasks should be happening in succession. The tasks are identified in the Recovery Phase of the Tree: conduct area decontamination, implement a mission recovery plan, assess and repair the installation infrastructure, assess the long-term health impact, and conduct follow-up and post-incident analysis or review.

Conduct Area Decontamination. The OSC must be prepared to:

Decontaminate the most important items (mission and health essential) first and the least important items last.

Decontaminate only what is necessary. Consider the mission, time, and the extent of contamination, protective equipment status, and the decontamination assets available.

Decontaminate as close to the site of contamination as possible. Do not move contaminated equipment, personnel, or remains away from the operational area if it is possible to bring decontamination assets (organic or supporting units) forward safely. This will keep the equipment on location, speed decontamination, and limit the spread of contamination to other areas.

Additional decontamination options include: disposal isolation, weathering, or natural chemical breakdown.

Therefore, installation commanders must have the capability to quickly and effectively conduct area decontamination as required to allow safe passage and future use of the area by authorized personnel. Coordination with the BE and CE representatives for requirements to control and dispose of all contamination or runoff, and requests for support may be necessary. The BE and CE representatives should determine the safety of these areas based on the type of agent and other safety concerns. Proper decontamination is critical and costly in terms of manpower, time, space, material, and other assets.

Implement a Mission Recovery Plan (Figure 19). This phase normally begins with an assessment of the area after the scene has been declared safe. The OSC has primary responsibility to approve all recovery operations. Restoration of the area is a long-range project, but general restoration steps should appear in the plan. Top priorities are reestablishing mission capability, developing a plan to cover short- and long-term recovery

requirements, and returning to normal operations. Specific consideration should be given to the mitigation of damage to the environment.

Figure 19. Mission Recovery Planning.



The Recovery Plan should address, when applicable:

- Medical, firefighting, security, utilities, and logistics support.
- Procedures for documenting and reporting resource expenditures.
- Contamination control.
- Preventing environmental pollution and area restoration.
- Mitigation and rendering safe all explosive hazards.
- Removal of hazardous materials.
- Preparation of property damage and personal injury estimates.
- Public affairs activities.
- Liaison procedures with DoD, State, Federal, and civil investigation officials.
- Removal of wreckage.

- Site restoration.
- Requirements for mishap investigations.
- Development of “lessons learned” report.
- Personnel protective equipment (PPE), post-traumatic stress, blood-borne pathogen exposure, medical screening, and bioassay requirements and procedures for all victims and responders.

Assess and Repair the Installation Infrastructure. Assessment, of the installation’s infrastructure and assets after an attack, is conducted by all functional areas. This includes all aircraft, facilities, vehicles, and equipment. Chemical and biological agents used in an attack usually would not cause much physical damage to the installation, only contamination. Relocation of such items may be necessary when persistent contamination is still present.

NOTE: Special circumstances are associated with contamination that tends to settle in basements and other low areas, rubble piles, and similar collections of debris, or into porous surfaces. This concentration could extend the lethality period of chemical and biological agents. A device producing a nuclear yield or using a radiation-dispersion device may also cause structural damage. The damage would be limited by the size of the conventional explosive; residual radiation would be the real danger. If radioactive residue is found, coordinate disposal efforts with the authorities.

Short and Long-Term Casualty Care and Management. The type of attack and the means of delivery will determine whether immediate and/or long-term medical assistance is necessary. The ability to quickly and correctly assess the agent and provide appropriate medical care and supplies will have implications regarding the operational effectiveness of the installation, the medical facilities, and the populace after an attack. The impact can be immediate, long-term, or a combination of the two. Symptom recognition and required actions during a terrorist WMD incident/attack are covered in local unit/individual NBC Defense training programs.

Immediate Impact.

Chemical attacks. Casualties may appear immediately, or symptoms may be delayed. Medical personnel may encounter an immediate spike in casualties that will overload their capabilities. There is a possibility that follow-on casualties may not appear for a while, depending on the agent. Requirements would be immediate and massive, and casualty management would require a large and readily accessible antidote supply. Procedures for obtaining these antidotes must be well established.

Biological attacks. If the type of pathogen is not quickly determined and medical treatment not readily available, expect very large numbers of casualties. From the time of an attack to the incubation period, zero casualties would report to medical personnel for treatment. Depending on the agent used, a peak in casualties would take place within a few days (for anthrax) or up to two months (for brucellosis) and could quickly overload medical personnel and facilities.

Long-Term Impact.

Biological attacks. By the time it is determined that a biological attack occurred, it might be too late for a vaccination to be effective for victims of primary exposure. This, coupled with the contagious and sometimes dormant nature of some agents, can lead to infections that would contribute to long-term consequences. Commanders should be made aware of any medical intent to move biological casualties. Medical personnel should be aware that commanders must obtain approval for the movement of casualties with internationally quarantinable diseases through the appropriate lead agencies (FBI or DoS), or the Centers for Disease Control.

Radiological attacks. Radiation exposure can have acute and long-term effects, and required medical treatment may be extensive.

Post-Incident Analysis/Review.

Work with investigation teams. Appropriate officials will investigate and identify the cause of the WMD incident/attack. Report findings.

Compile inputs from all participating units.

Periodically review the OSC's checklist and the Recovery Plan and follow up on open action items.

Keep track of recovery activities and work with the OSC to arrange DCG briefings when significant actions are completed or due.

The OSC has completed recovery involving Air Force resources after:

Obtaining proof of existence or nonexistence of contamination.

Identifying, accounting for, or recovering all classified and HAZMAT.

Ensuring all representatives complete their necessary observations.

Removing wreckage and restoring the site in coordination with DoJ investigation officials and, if necessary, civil authorities.

Completing lessons learned/after action reports.



RECOGNIZING A BIOLOGICAL INCIDENT HAS OCCURRED

Recognition that a biological attack has occurred is perhaps the most problematic challenge for installation response.

Introduction. Biological weapons are unique. They can be employed with minimal resources and effort, by means that can be undetectable and untraceable, and they can inflict large numbers of casualties over a wide area. Therefore, installation personnel should be aware of, and alert to, the possibility of a biological incident on the installation.

While previous sections provided an overview of a typical terrorist WMD incident/attack, they do not take into account an “unobserved” biological event. The response to an unobserved biological attack is distinctly different from an observed (easily identifiable) terrorist WMD attack. The initial response will rest primarily with the medical community, with other installation functional areas activated as necessary.

Determine That a Biological Incident Has Occurred. The first, and most difficult, problem is determining that a biological event has occurred. Some indicators include:

- Diseases occurring that are unusual for a geographic area or time of year.
- Multiple diseases in one patient.
- Significant numbers of patients with similar symptoms.
- Evidence of mass “point source” outbreaks.
- Illness in a small, localized geographic area.
- Low sickness rates in protected personnel (those masked or indoors).
- Increased unit personnel absences.
- Dead animals of multiple species.
- An apparent aerosol route of infection.
- Claims by aggressors (could be a hoax)
- A local civilian community experiencing similar problems.

A sensitive medical surveillance system located in the medical treatment facility and general medical provider awareness are the two best avenues for early detection if automated detectors did not detect release of the agent involved.

Methods of Dissemination. Understanding how biological agents are disseminated will increase installation awareness and the likelihood of a more timely and effective response.

Methods of dissemination at the installation will normally be of two types:

A line source: This technique is most effective using a dispersal means (a truck or air sprayer moving perpendicular to the wind during an inversion air stability condition (in which air temperature increases with altitude, holding surface air and pollutants down; inversions normally occur at dawn, dusk, or night).

A point source: This technique uses small bomblets deployed in a saturation mode. The saturation technique overcomes the meteorological requirements for line source dissemination. Agents may be introduced into buildings' heating-ventilation-air conditioning systems or via food or water contamination. Small packages or envelopes may also be used to disperse the agent.

Training and awareness of these two means of attack will increase the responders' ability to recognize and react to a terrorist biological attack.

Remember:

Both aerosol sprays and food and water contamination attacks have the potential to cause large numbers of casualties.

Most means of protection against a chemical inhalant attack are largely effective against a biological attack too, particularly the mask.

A biological attack may require the treatment of those individuals who were exposed, but have not yet exhibited symptoms.

While it is individually useful, area decontamination after a biological attack may not provide further reduction in casualties, depending on the agent involved.

Actions for a Suspected Biological Attack. If a suspected attack occurs, the following diagnostic questions may prove beneficial:

What does the initial assessment reveal?

What is a possible incubation period?

Is the problem infectious?

By this stage, has the preventive medicine staff been consulted for relevant input?

Is quarantine suggested or warranted? If so, have command authorities implemented procedures for quarantine enforcement, to include "Use of Force Policy," in close coordination with medical, JAG, and local authorities.

Note: Keep victims informed of their status and of the quarantine actions being taken to safeguard them. Lack of timely information may cause panic, disorder, or even riot. Use of clearly established rules of engagement (ROE's) is essential to maintain and restore order.

Is movement of the patients necessary?

If so, has the applicable agency (the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention or DoS) given approval?

What procedures are in place for initiating an installation-wide response?

What treatments are currently available at the base?

Emphasis for Ongoing Programs. The extreme effects of a terrorist biological attack can be largely mitigated—through command emphasis on *existing* health maintenance and management programs, when thoughtfully integrated into an installation's WMD threat planning and response system.

The senior medical representative, with the support of Public Health, BE and CE personnel, is the primary functional area expert involved in determining the existence of a biological attack. Collectively, these subject matter experts, often using their preexisting water, food, medical surveillance and environmental programs, can assist the installation commander.

To identify a biological incident, installation leadership should integrate:

- Water and food inspection programs.
- Environmental monitoring programs.
- Disease monitoring programs.
- Proper physical protection (facilities and PPE).
- Decontamination procedures for medical facilities.
- Forensic identification means.
- Vaccine and diagnostic programs.
- Training and awareness programs.
- Good intelligence and event notification programs.

All installations can significantly improve recognition and response to a biological attack through use of BE, CE and public health programs. The installation's maintenance of a high order of health, hygiene, and sanitation will minimize the spread of disease following a terrorist biological attack. The medical facility commander should convert scientific SME reports into clear advice to the commander on:

The acute and long-term health effects on the installation of a biological attack and the medical support requirements for such an attack.

How biological attack countermeasures and prophylaxis side effects may degrade mission performance.

Coordinating investigations of unusual sicknesses on the installation.

Outbreak management in the case of communicable diseases resulting from a biological terrorist act.



MASTER WMD INCIDENT CHECKLIST

All incidents have a common, cross-functional general response flow. The installation commander, OSC, DCG members, and on-site senior fire official will find this master incident checklist useful. The checklist is set up chronologically, to the greatest extent possible; however, numerous activities will be conducted concurrently.

MASTER WMD RESPONSE CHECKLIST		
Item	Activity	OPR
---	Incident Occurs	N/A
---	Wing Operations Center Notified	All
	___ Recall/Activate Initial Response Element Note: Follow on Element preparing for response.	WOC
	___ Notify Installation Commander	WOC
	___ Notify the NMCC ___ Initiate OPREP-3 Pinnacle Reporting ___ Maintain continuous telephone contact with next higher headquarters	WOC
---	Respond to incident site and identify safe routes for Follow on Force.	IRE/WOC
---	Notify appropriate lead agency of suspected terrorist WMD incident (FBI)	WOC /OSI
---	Provide continuous updates to installation CC and staff as requested	WOC
---	Assume On-Scene Commander Responsibility	OSC/SFO
---	Approach incident site (from upwind/crosswind direction). Take immediate actions to:	IRE

MASTER WMD RESPONSE CHECKLIST		
Item	Activity	OPR
	___ Check for victims	IRE
	___ Conduct immediate lifesaving procedures	IRE
	___ Move victims to safety	IRE
	___ Conduct patient decontamination	IRE
	___ Conduct fire-suppression activities	IRE
	___ Establish hot, warm, and cold zones	SFO
	___ Conduct first responder decontamination	OSC/SFO
_____	Determine evacuation requirements	OSC/SFO
_____	Conduct evacuation as necessary	SF
_____	Establish communications with the Installation Command Post and provide initial SITREP	OSC/SFO
_____	Perform initial site evaluation and report to OSC/SFO Responders must be aware of the following:	IRE
	Physical evidence (must be preserved)	Responders
	Indicators of potential use of WMD	Responders
	Potential use of IED or triggering device	Responders
	Potential for secondary device(s)	Responders
	Potential for hostile forces	Responders
_____	Perform Presumptive Detection/Sampling	Responders

MASTER WMD RESPONSE CHECKLIST		
Item	Activity	OPR
___	Ensure classified information/material is secured	OSC/IRE
___	Identify incident coordinates (including ECP)	SFO
___	Determine cordon size	OSC/SFO
___	Establish cordon and ECP	SF
___	FOE responds to ECP	OSC
___	Provide convoy (FOE) force protection in transit and at the site	SF
	Upon arrival the FOE will:	
	___ Brief arriving OSC and transfer control of the scene	SFO
	___ Advise appropriate level of PPE	BE/ Medical
	___ Conduct hazard prediction and toxic corridor	SFO
	___ Perform RSP on IED or triggering devices	EOD
	___ Report “positive” and “negative” WMD indicators	All
___	Identify/categorize incident by type (see possible indicators below)	OSC/SFO
	Possible indicators for a biological incident are:	
	___ Unusual numbers of sick or dying people or animals	

MASTER WMD RESPONSE CHECKLIST		
Item	Activity	OPR
	___ Unscheduled/unusual dissemination of liquid or spray (especially outdoors or at night)	
	___ Abandoned dispersal devices, containers or lab equipment	
	___ Diagnosis of a non-endemic disease.	
	___ Positive results of Presumptive Detection /Sampling	
	Possible indicators for a nuclear (radiological) incident are:	
	___ An explosion	
	___ Apparent release of radiological materials	
	___ Readings on detection instruments (RADIAC)	
	Possible indicators of a incendiary incident are:	
	___ Multiple fires	
	___ Remains of incendiary device components	
	___ Odors of accelerants, such as gasoline or fuel oil	
	___ Unusually heavy burning or fire volume	
	Possible indicators of a chemical incident are:	
	___ Low order explosions dispersing liquid, spray, mist or gas	
	___ Explosions appearing only to destroy a package or device	
	___ Rapid onset of similar symptoms in a large group of people	

MASTER WMD RESPONSE CHECKLIST		
Item	Activity	OPR
	___ Mass fatalities without other signs of trauma (specific to nerve agent	
	___ HAZMATs, containers, or lab equipment not indigenous to the incident area.	
	___ Individuals reporting unusual odors or tastes	
	___ Unusual product dissemination	
	___ Abandoned dispersal devices such as a mist generator	
	___ Numerous dead animals, fish or birds	
	___ Absence of normal insect life	
	Possible indicators for an explosive device are:	
	___ Large-scale facility damage	
	___ Blown out windows and widely scattered debris	
	___ Victims exhibiting blast effects such as shrapnel-induced trauma and the appearance of shock-like symptoms (e.g. eardrum damage)	
___	Release information to local community officials through Public Affairs	Installation CC
___	Initiate request for additional DoD resources, as received from OSC/SFO	WOC
___	Notify local emergency response authorities and request mutual aid as required	OSC/SFO
___	Coordinate with functional DCG reps for briefings and status reports	WOC

MASTER WMD RESPONSE CHECKLIST		
Item	Activity	OPR
___	Coordinate with SJA and establish an NDA if incident extends off-base (only within US, its territories, or possessions, the District of Columbia or other places with US jurisdiction.	OSC/SFO
___	Establish roster of personnel entering the site	SF
___	Establish procedures to monitor "stay times" for entry team(s) if required.	BE/Medical
___	Conduct occupational and environmental surveillance and health risk assessment	BE
___	Ship positive sample for confirmatory analysis on to a Level B Lab. (Biological Only, Chain of Custody Rules Apply)	SG
	The Installation Disaster Control Group Will:	
___	Manage all activities at the incident site and maintain a log of events	CE Readiness
___	Assemble at designated location, receive briefing and review checklists and available resources	DCG
___	Issue antidotes, as required	SG
___	Determine personnel exposure levels	SG
___	Advise OSC/SFO on work-rest cycles	BE
___	Provide raw weather data and situational information as needed	WX
___	Establish medical receiving capability at the entry/exit control points	SG
___	Implement patient tracking and movement plan	SG

MASTER WMD RESPONSE CHECKLIST		
Item	Activity	OPR
	___ Notify medical facilities of numbers of patients and their status	SG
	___ Transport patients, as necessary	SG
	___ Conduct additional detailed detection/.sampling surveys as necessary	CE/BE
	___ Position appropriate detection and sampling devices	CE/BE
	___ Establish continuous monitoring capability	CE/BE
	___ Adjust cordon, as necessary, based on detection results	OSC/SFO
	___ Refine assessment for current/potential hazards based on results	OSC/SFO
___	Control or contain and dispose of contaminated assets	All
___	Coordinate activities of mutual aid/DoD resources as they arrive	OSC/SFO
___	Ensure augmentation units have compatible Communications Systems and equipment	COMM
___	Pass control of the scene to higher authority, as the situation dictates	OSC
___	Withdraw all response elements, as the situation dictates	OSC
___	Develop and implement recovery actions	All
___	Terminate the response	OSC



WMD THREAT PLANNING AND RESPONSE TREE

DEFINITIONS OF OPERATIONAL AND ENABLING TASKS (see Figure 8).

PRE-INCIDENT.

OPERATIONS TASK 1: DEFENSE, RESPONSE, RECOVERY PLANNING.

Definition: All planning activities encompassed by pre-incident, incident, and post-incident phases.

ENABLING TASKS 1 - 7:

1. Policy and Doctrine:

Definition: Valid and authoritative, written teaching, directions, instructions or guidance.

2. Baseline Planning:

Definition: Assess the installation; plan posture for resources available.

3. Risk Assessment & Management:

Definition: Identify base shortfalls/vulnerabilities; identify the level of risk base commander is willing to accept.

4. Response Planning:

Definition: Response planning refers to installation's written plan that outlines who does what and when after an incident happens.

5. Shared Response Planning:

Definition: Refers to any assistance not organic to the base, including nearby military installations (regardless of service) and local/ state/federal or host nation support.

6. Mass Care Planning:

Definition: Planning for the care of victims after an incident to include the distribution of food, water, and shelter.

7. Public Affairs Planning:

Definition: A plan that outlines how the Public Affairs Officer will inform the public and handle the media in the event of a terrorist WMD incident/attack.

OPERATIONS TASK 2: EDUCATION AND AWARENESS, TRAINING AND EXERCISE.

Definition: Actions taken to improve the knowledge and capability of installation responders and inhabitants, and to ensure CB-focused, systemic exercises are planned.

ENABLING TASKS 1-7:

1. Technical Education:

Definition: Education in a classroom, not training, that teaches airmen how to operate in an WMD hazard environment, and that teaches WMD threat response specialists mission-related tasks.

2. Community Awareness:

Definition: Programs, TV and otherwise, that increase the awareness of the surrounding community to the terrorist WMD threat.

3. Individual CB Training Plan:

Definition: Actual WMD hazard-focused training that teaches airmen how to operate and do their jobs in a WMD environment.

4. Collective WMD Training Plan:

Definition: Actual WMD hazard-focused training that teaches units or groups of airmen how to operate in a WMD hazard environment.

5. Collective WMD Exercises:

Definition: Exercises that allow all functional areas and base personnel to conduct WMD threat response missions.

6. Shared Response Training:

Definition: Training conducted with any element not organic to the base, to include nearby military installations and local/state/Federal or host nation.

7. Shared Response Exercises:

Definition: Exercises conducted with any element not organic to the base, to include nearby military installations (regardless of Service) and local/state/Federal or host nation.

OPERATIONS TASK 3: RESOURCING.

Definition: Applicable WMD focused resourcing of available manpower, equipment.

ENABLING TASKS 1-8:

1. Physical Security Upgrades:

Definition: Implementing the physical security upgrades outlined during the baselining and risk management activities of the base.

2. Functional Organization:

Definition: Reviewing current WMD threat response functional areas for structural sufficiency.

3. Initial Response Equipment:

Definition: Providing technical equipment for initial responders.

4. Personnel Protective Equipment:

Definition: Providing PPE for installation response personnel.

5. Detection Equipment:

Definition: Providing detection equipment to bases for first responders or follow on elements to determine what WMD threat is present.

6. Contamination Control Equipment:

Definition: Providing contamination control equipment to responders or follow on elements.

7. Mass Care Equipment:

Definition: Providing subsistence means and equipment for base displaced persons.

8. Medical Prophylaxis:

Definition: Maintaining and administering sufficient amounts of antidotes.

OPERATIONS TASK 4: ASSESS AND INSPECT.

Definition: A systematic evaluation of WMD threat response programs at a USAF installation, organization or activity.

ENABLING TASKS 1-8:

1. DoD Assessment:

Definition: Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments conducted at DoD installations.

2. Service Assessment:

Definition: USAF Vulnerability Assessment Teams.

3. MAJCOM Assessment:

Definition: MAJCOM Vulnerability Assessment Team (used when DoD or Air Force level assessments can not be scheduled every 3 years).

4. Installation Assessment:

Definition: Base-level WMD Threat Response Assessment (the installation commander's assessment).

5. DoD Inspection:

Definition: DoD-level inspection program.

6. Service Inspection:

Definition: USAF-level inspection program.

7. Higher HQs Inspection:

Definition: MAJCOM or other Higher HQs Inspection program.

8. Installation Inspection:

Definition: Base-level inspection program.

OPERATIONS TASK 5: OTHER WMD-FOCUSED OPERATIONS.

Definition: Planned support operations that further prepare the installation to respond to a WMD incident/attack.

ENABLING TASKS 1-5:

1. Command & Control:

Definition: Existence of a C2 system for WMD incident/attack response.

2. Intelligence:

Definition: Existence of an intelligence system responsive to terrorist WMD threats. This includes information dissemination and organizational processes.

3. Communications ways & means:

Definition: Existence of a communications system (equipment, nets, frequencies) to be used for WMD threat response.

4. Biological Trend Analysis:

Definition: Existence of a medically-based trend analysis system capable of detecting a biological incident.

5. Alert & Warning:

Definition: Existence of means to alert and warn the base populace of an impending or occurring WMD event.

INCIDENT

OPERATIONS TASK 6: NOTIFICATION.

Definition: The conveyance of information reporting a suspected or actual WMD incident/attack.

ENABLING TASKS 1-7:

1. Detect event:

Definition: As a result of a suspected or detected WMD incident/attack — notify.

2. Identify event by type:

Definition: As a result of a suspected or detected WMD incident/attack — Identify / categorize as biological, nuclear/radiological, incendiary, chemical or explosive.

3. Alert Responders:

Definition: Existence of a systematic means to activate the response force.

4. Conduct Timely Warning to C2:

Definition: Existence of a systematic means to advise and standup incident command structure.

5. Alert Installation:

Definition: Using the existing means, alert and warn the base populace of an impending or occurring WMD event.

6. *Establish Communications with local US or Host Nation agencies or govt:**Definition:* Establishing communication with the community and local/ HN agencies that have MOUs or existing shared response agreements with the base.

7. *Notify HQ:*

Definition: Existence of means and procedures to notify higher headquarters of a WMD incident/attack.

OPERATIONS TASK 7: INITIAL RESPONSE PHASE.

Definition: The immediate actions using the installation's assets required as the result of a WMD incident/attack.

ENABLING TASKS 1-8:

1. *Initiate Protective Measures:*

Definition: Existence of protocols for donning of protective gear and initiation of protective measures during response to a WMD incident/attack.

2. *Casualty Management:*

Definition: Existence of protocols for treatment, triage, decon, and movement of casualties.

3. *Contain the Event:*

Definition: Existence of gross containment means and procedures to isolate the incident site.

4. *Identify by Type:*

Definition: Existence of technical means and procedures to more accurately identify the incident by type.

5. *Predict the Effects:*

Definition: Existence of a means and procedures for WMD hazard prediction.

6. Augment Base Response:

Definition: Existence of procedures to augment the base's response to a WMD event.

7. Protect the Base and Community:

Definition: Existence of means and procedures to warn the base and the community of a WMD incident/attack, and to advise on proper response.

8. Avoid Contamination:

Definition: Existence of procedures for controlling movement (cordon, evacuation, remain stationary, WMD-focused activities).

OPERATIONS TASK 8: CONTINUING RESPONSE PHASE

Definition: Actions conducted in conjunction with follow-on elements, including external assets, to respond to the WMD incident/attack.

ENABLING TASKS 1-5:

1. Site Management Operations:

Definition: Based on magnitude of the incident, continue and expand response actions.

2. Casualty Management:

Definition: Existence of protocols for treatment, triage, decon, and movement of casualties.

3. Control Incident Site:

Definition: Existence of protocols for event-specific containment.

4. Contain Contaminated Material:

Definition: Existence of means (technical or simple/expedient) and procedures to safely contain the area of contamination, and control the material.

5. Implement Continued Shared Response:

Definition: Existence of procedures to further augment the base's response to a WMD event.

POST-INCIDENT

OPERATIONS TASK 9: RECOVERY.

Definition: Actions taken to restore the installation to fully mission- capable, pre-incident status.

ENABLING TASKS 1-3:

1. Conduct wide area decontamination:

Definition: Existence of plans and process to return the area to a pre-event condition (includes external assistance).

2. Implement mission recovery plan:

Definition: Existence of plans designed to maintain or restore the pre - attack operational capability of the installation.

3. Assess and repair installation infrastructure:

Definition: Existence of plans designed to maintain or restore the pre- attack support capability of the installation.



PART B. THREAT PLANNING AND RESPONSE USERS' TOOLS

OVERVIEW RESPONDERS

INTRODUCTION. **Part A** of this handbook provided essential background information for planning and executing a response to a terrorist WMD attack on any USAF installation worldwide, in peace, during contingencies, or war. **Part B** provides first responders and follow-on elements with a set of tools designed to help execute a more fluid, efficient, cross-functional response to a terrorist WMD incident/attack on the installation.

Using Part B. The Responders' Tools are presented as follows:

The **"If ... Then..." WMD Threat-Specific Trees.**

As the first responders approach the incident site, they begin the on-site assessment; using the indicators present, responders will eliminate the various threats and activate the appropriate follow-on elements to respond to the specific threat.

Functional Area Checklists.

Although all incident response is cross-functional, there are function-specific requirements. Additionally, location-, command node-, and position-specific requirements exist.

Use this set of checklists according to function, location, or position to guide response actions.

NOTE. Many of these items and checklists will be in simultaneous use.

Cordon Distance Default for WMD Incidents.

Many cordon distance guidelines exist. This guide highlights the most applicable requirements for a terrorist WMD incident/attack.

This handbook sets 2,000 feet as the standard to establish a cordon; an installation will deviate from the standard as the situation dictates.

The Notification and Resource Activation Tables (Domestic and Foreign).

A terrorist WMD incident/attack at an installation will prompt a chain of notifications throughout DoD and USG. The Notification Table helps installations understand and implement correct notification procedures.

The response capability of an installation may be overwhelmed by the scope of an incident. In this case, additional resources may be requested. The resource allocation tables will help installations understand what is available and how to get that help.


Chemical and Biological Agent Matrices.


Consolidation of information on the nature of each threat is useful. These summaries provide:


- Threat type
- Specific threat agent
- Dissemination means
- Symptoms
- Immediate treatment
- Transmissibility and infectivity





IF-THEN DECISION TREES











FUNCTIONAL AREA CHECKLISTS

An Introduction to the Response Checklists. Earlier, this handbook described the operational tasks and enabling tasks associated with planning and preparing for incident response. These two sets of tasks provide the foundational framework upon which an installation can build its response capability. Yet the two sets of tasks stop short of providing specific, integrated, cross-functional, incident response tasks for response elements. This section provides those specific functional tasks, identified as Functional Area Checklists.

These checklists are varied.

- Some provide task-specific guidance for commanders.

- Some provide task-specific guidance for planners and staffs.

- Some provide task-specific guidance for responders, both immediate first responders and those with responsibilities for follow-on support.

These Functional Area Checklists and their described actions ensure a thoroughly integrated, cross-functional response. The following section provides an overview of the command and control and response structure.

CHECKLIST 1—INSTALLATION COMMANDER	
<i>Pre-Incident</i>	
___	Establish a cell to conduct defense, response, and recovery planning.
___	Baseline the installation and identify shortfalls in response capabilities of all functional areas; identify equipment necessary to respond to a terrorist WMD incident/attack for all functional areas.
___	Coordinate mutual support agreements with civil authorities; maintain a working relationship.
___	For installations located in foreign countries, coordinate mutual support agreements with nearby organizations and ensure that support requirements comply with host nation agreements.
___	Identify the installation's WMD response chain of command.
___	Identify any local, state, Federal, or host nation authorities that must be notified in the event of a terrorist WMD incident/attack.
___	Establish an installation-centralized command and control facility.
___	Identify MAJCOM/CINC response capabilities (specialized teams) and activation procedures.
___	Ensure individual readiness posture (IRP) through a viable health protection program.
___	Conduct active and passive defensive measures.
___	Establish and direct installation FPCON.
___	Establish a command and control plan.
___	Appoint an OSC and an alternate to exercise command and control at WMD response operations.
___	Staff and equip the DRF to respond to a terrorist WMD incident/attack.
___	Direct individual and collective protection actions.
___	Ensure that the appropriate organizations install and maintain an installation warning system.

<i>Pre-Incident continued</i>	
___	Assess the installation's ability mitigate, respond to, and recover from a terrorist WMD incident/attack.
___	Provide adequate resources to ensure that the installation is properly trained and equipped to respond to a terrorist WMD incident/attack.
___	Assess the installation's WMD response capability through annual exercises and plan reviews.
___	Request funds for unprogrammed requirements through higher headquarters.
<i>Incident</i>	
___	Oversee response operations on the installation.
___	Establish and oversee the survival recovery center.
___	Initiate increased FPCONs as needed.
___	Ensure that the installation command post is activated.
___	Recall DCG members; if they are not needed initially, they can provide advice and recommendations, assist with the recall, plot information, answer telephone or radio calls, and perform other necessary tasks.
___	Activate specialized teams.
___	Determine target of the attack: an installation facility? Military capability?
___	Decide if and when evacuation of installation facilities is appropriate.
___	Ensure that OPREP -3 reports are sent.
___	Ensure that news releases are made.
___	Contact civil officials if the incident affects, or has the potential to affect, off-base facilities.
___	Monitor on-scene actions.
___	Provide command oversight and decision-making, as necessary.
___	Request augmentation through DoD or local, state, or Federal agencies, as necessary.

<i>Post-Incident</i>	
—	Oversee response and recovery operations on the installation.
—	Review and approve necessary reports following the incident, including lessons learned/ after action reports.

CHECKLIST 2—INSTALLATION COMMAND POST	
<i>Pre-Incident</i>	
___	Identify a primary and an alternate location for the installation command post.
___	Establish procedures for the installation command post, including duties and responsibilities, staffing, communications, and reports and timelines for notification to higher headquarters; equip the command post with communications gear, information systems, and visual aids (status boards, installation grid maps, overlays, bulletin boards).
___	Maintain installation notification rosters.
___	Establish emergency notification rosters of all appropriate agencies (FEMA, local law enforcement, the FBI, DoS) and maintain liaison.
___	Establish NBC warning and reporting systems or networks (integrated with the Global Command and Control System, if available).
___	Establish preformatted or preaddressed messages for OPREP-3 and NBC Warning and Reporting System (NBCWRS).
<i>Incident</i>	
___	Activate recall procedures.
___	Initiate OPREP-3 and up channel NBC Warning, Reporting System (NBCWRS) reports.
___	Issue FPCON change as directed by the Installation Commander.
___	Establish communications with the incident site.
___	Notify higher headquarters.
___	Notify the nearest military installation.
___	Alert mutual aid partners; relay requests for on-scene support to appropriate agencies; pass the name of the OSC and a point of contact for coordinating assistance.
___	Activate the installation warning system; notify the base populace by Giant Voice, television, or other predetermined means on proper procedures to avoid the incident site, evacuate, or shelter in place.

CHECKLIST 2—INSTALLATION COMMAND POST	
<i>Incident Continued</i>	
—	Request assistance from civil authorities, in accordance with mutual support agreements, as required.
—	Receive and send orders, information, and requests pertinent to the incident; submit reports.
—	Plot the incident on the installation map.
—	Set up incident information boards (or use existing software technology) for immediate access to incident information. Include the situation or status; an event casualty summary; a damage summary; weather status; evacuation status; area closing status; shelter facility status; resources or equipment status; medical facility (base and local) bed availability; and contracts or agreements or services. Maintain an incident log.
—	Keep higher headquarters advised of current situation and actions in progress.
—	Monitor the Readiness Flight radio frequency.
—	Brief the installation commander and staff on the status of operations.
—	Disseminate information to, and collect information from, unit control centers (UCC) and the mobile command post.
<i>Post-Incident</i>	
—	Monitor recovery operations and support the needs of the installation commander and OSC.
—	Develop and make input to lessons learned/after action reports.

CHECKLIST 3—ON-SCENE COMMANDER	
<i>Pre-Incident</i>	
___	Attend the On-Scene Commander's Course at Maxwell Air Force Base.
___	Ensure that all DCG functional areas are properly equipped and trained to respond to a terrorist WMD incident/attack.
___	Ensure a means to identify each functional area at the incident site (using, for example, colored vests, armbands, and a personnel accountability system).
<i>Incident</i>	
___	Assemble and account for all DCG members.
___	Establish assembly areas for the DCG in a controlled environment so that functional members can conduct initial briefings, evaluate the situation at hand, and determine who should proceed to the scene, with what equipment, in which order, and by what route.
___	Remain at the assembly point until asked to proceed to the incident site.
___	Determine the status of the incident and assess the threat of terrorists or protesters.
___	Be on the lookout for secondary devices (IED).
___	Treat the incident as a crime scene; preserve evidence.
___	Determine the need for, and direct the establishment of, an NDA (domestic incidents only).
___	Provide on-scene command and control of response elements.
___	Establish communication with the installation command post.
___	Submit incident situation reports to the installation command post.
___	Direct actions to save lives, mitigate damage, and restore primary mission assets.
___	Establish hot, warm, and cold zones.
___	Ensure that all responders entering the contaminated area have appropriate protective clothing and equipment.

CHECKLIST 3—ON-SCENE COMMANDER	
<i>Incident Continued</i>	
___	Identify the type of agent involved as soon as possible through monitoring and detection operations.
___	Ensure protective measures for DCG members and personnel working at the incident scene, such as work-rest regimes and protective measures against climatic conditions, adequate food and water, and sanitary facilities.
___	Initiate comprehensive control, decontamination, and medical intervention activities.
___	Receive follow-on elements and assign work areas and POCs for functional areas.
___	Coordinate required support from higher headquarters response elements.
___	Ensure information about the incident is released; coordinate approval of a news release within one hour after the incident.
___	Determine the cause of the incident.
___	Ensure the control and protection of classified material.
___	Transfer control of the site to a higher authority, as directed. Provide a detailed situation report to include the product released, operations taken or in progress, call signs, all resources on site, additional resources on call or enroute, and any other considerations.
<i>Post-Incident</i>	
___	Serve as the senior military representative until recovery operations are complete or until relieved by a higher authority or responsible agency.
___	Oversee immediate cleanup or recovery efforts.
___	Establish priorities based on installation commander guidance for resuming operations.
___	Continue to ensure the safety of personnel.
___	Assess remaining hazards.

CHECKLIST 3—ON-SCENE COMMANDER	
<i>Post-Incident Continued</i>	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Ensure security at the incident scene is maintained.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Keep detailed records.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Conduct immediate cleanup efforts to return the incident site to pre-emergency conditions.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Conduct a comprehensive remediation effort, using outside contracted support if necessary.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Review and comment on incident lessons learned/after action reports.

CHECKLIST 4—DISASTER CONTROL GROUP	
<i>Pre-Incident</i>	
Installation Commander will:	
___	Establish primary and alternate from functional areas for DCG.
___	Identify the OSC and the alternate OSC.
The OSC will:	
___	Designate a primary and an alternate assembly area; far enough apart to avoid both areas being affected by the same incident.
___	Establish procedures for activating the DCG via the command post.
___	Ensure all DCG members receive initial training.
<i>Incident</i>	
___	Assemble all DCG members at the designated assembly area.
___	Provide functional expertise to the OSC.
___	Review functional area checklists to raise awareness of the task to be carried out.
___	Issue identification badges (i.e., badges, vest, etc.) for all members to differentiate between functional areas.
___	Commit unit resources.
___	Coordinate requirements for follow-on elements through functional representatives at the command post or unit control center.
___	Coordinate actions to control the immediate response and follow-up actions.
___	Request assistance from civilian counterparts and advise the OSC.
<i>Post-Incident</i>	
___	Oversee functional areas for recovery operations.
___	Continue to advise and support the OSC during recovery operations.
___	All representatives should develop and make input to incident lessons learned/after action reports.

CHECKLIST 5—FIRE	
<i>Pre-Incident</i>	
The Fire Chief will:	
___	Attend the On-Scene Commander's Course at Maxwell AFB.
___	Pre-plan for known and existing hazards.
___	Identify equipment required to respond to an incident.
___	Identify training required to respond to an incident.
___	Train and equip to respond to an incident.
<i>Incident</i>	
___	The Senior Fire Official will:
___	After all hostile force/terrorist activity has been neutralized by security forces, assume command of on-scene operations and perform OSC duties until the arrival of the designated OSC. (See the OSC checklist to initiate on-scene actions.)
___	Determine the initial cordon size, based on the type and quantity of material involved at the incident.
___	Establish an initial ECP outside the disaster cordon, either up wind or cross wind from the incident site.
___	Implement a personnel accountability system.
___	Brief the OSC on the situation status upon the OSC's arrival at the incident scene.
___	Direct all firefighting, HAZMAT and rescue operations, and declare withdrawal if necessary.
___	Serve as a technical advisor and update the OSC as required.
___	Request follow-on elements through the FCC.
___	Request mutual aid as required.
___	Continually reassess the cordon size and locations of the ECP based on weather conditions and recovery operations.

CHECKLIST 5—FIRE	
<i>Incident Continued</i>	
___	Provide the hazard prediction using available software based on HAZMAT type, source strength, container size, breach size and other pertinent information
___	Upon identification of the agent, advise on establishing hot, warm, and cold zones.
___	Contact the supporting weather unit to determine what additional weather information is available to assist in response and determining the hazard calculation.
___	Firefighting personnel will:
___	Conduct and continue size-up for possible terrorist WMD activities.
___	Assess the potential for a secondary device/booby trap.
___	Conduct detection activities as capability allows.
___	Conduct immediate lifesaving operations.
___	Conduct fire-suppression activities.
___	Assist in hazard prediction.
___	Provide extrication and removal of the injured.
___	Transfer of injured to medical personnel for treatment and transport.
___	Conduct field (gross) decontamination of patients as required.
___	Implement all activities identified by the SFO.
___	Provide a HAZMAT response team.
___	Set up decontamination station to process personnel out of the hot zone.
___	When fire department resources or capabilities are exhausted or are not available, request additional assistance as required.
<i>Post-Incident</i>	
___	Continue to support the needs of the OSC at the incident site.
___	Assess equipment and personnel readiness and capability to return to mission operations and request assistance as appropriate.
___	Develop and make input to incident lessons learned/after action reports.

CHECKLIST 6—SECURITY FORCES	
<i>Pre-Incident</i>	
___	Provide a primary and alternate representative to the DCG to coordinate actions to control the immediate response and follow-up actions.
___	Ensure each DCG member is trained.
___	Identify the need for personnel protective clothing, equipment, and supplies.
___	Identify training required to respond to an incident.
___	Identify augmentees if required to the Resource Augmentation Duty (READY) Program. Train and exercise augmenters.
___	Train and equip to respond to an incident.
___	Attend the On-Scene Commander's Course.
<i>Incident</i>	
___	The primary or alternate representative to the DCG will:
___	Proceed to the incident site and report to the OSC.
___	Consult with the OSC on security measures.
___	Coordinate personnel evacuation from the incident site.
___	Advise the OSC on procedures for establishing an NDA (Domestic incidents only).
___	Coordinate with local civil law enforcement on response requirements.
Security Force personnel will:	
___	Assess the threat of hostile forces in the area. Contain or neutralize hostile forces as required.
___	Set up an initial cordon based on input from the OSC/SFO.
___	Man and mark ECP (designated by OSC/SFO); use signs or flags for easy visibility. Establish ECP and control access to the site.
___	When possible, protect or treat the incident site as a crime scene and coordinate with AFOSI on investigative issues.
___	Establish an NDA if necessary.

CHECKLIST 6—SECURITY FORCES	
<i>Incident Continued</i>	
___	Ensure that classified material is moved to a secure location, as directed by the OSC.
___	Notify the Chief of Security Forces of the grid coordinates for the ECP so that this information can be passed on to other responding units.
___	Establish and maintain physical security of the disaster cordon, NDA, and ECP.
___	Secure all avenues of approach to the boundary of the cordon by Checklist 10—Civil Engineer.
___	Establish entry control procedures and control access to the incident site.
___	Coordinate personnel evacuation from the immediate area.
___	Control access on the perimeter and ensure that nothing departs the affected area (hot zone) without going through the decontamination process.
___	Coordinate with local civilian law enforcement agencies for follow-on elements.
___	Control safe routes with escort for delivery of supplies and for ambulance traffic to and from the affected area and to designated airfields for air evacuation.
___	Provide grid coordinates of the accident site and entry control point to the central security control or law enforcement desk.
___	Relocate the entry control point if directed by the OSC.
___	Remain alert for additional hostile actions.
<i>Post-Incident</i>	
___	Notify all nonessential personnel to evacuate from the incident site.
___	Beware of potential for secondary devices.
___	Reduce the size of the cordon (and NDA if applicable) when directed by the OSC.
___	Develop and make input to incident lessons learned/ after action reports.

CHECKLIST 7—MEDICAL SERVICES, CASUALTY CARE & MANAGEMENT	
<i>Pre-Incident</i>	
___	Provide a primary and an alternate representative to the DCG.
___	Develop medical response plans in concert with local and higher headquarters.
___	Establish a medical surveillance monitoring capability.
___	Establish liaison with local medical facilities; identify local response capabilities and facility bed capacity.
___	Establish emergency medical support (contracted or mutual aid) during non-duty hours.
___	Identify equipment required to respond to an incident.
___	Identify training required to respond to an incident.
___	Provide additional training to installation personnel on agent symptoms, pretreatment drugs, and antidotes as required by the installation commander.
___	Train and equip medical personnel to respond to an incident.
___	Establish agreements with local community medical facilities regarding the handling of patients.
___	Stockpile pretreatment drugs as intelligence indicates.
___	Establish contamination control procedures for the medical facility.
<i>Incident</i>	
___	The primary or alternate representative to the DCG will:
___	Report unusual clusters of disease that may indicate a BW attack to the Wing Commander.
___	Take necessary action to identify possible BW agents causing illness in base personnel.
___	Report potential BW incidents to Higher HQ.
___	Request assistance from outside sources such as the Center for

CHECKLIST 7—MEDICAL SERVICES, CASUALTY CARE & MANAGEMENT

Disease Control (CDC) as needed to confirm diagnosis and control further spread of disease.

Incident Continued

Proceed to the incident site and report to the OSC

- ___ Provide medical intelligence estimates in coordination with the Medical Intelligence Officer or NCO.
- ___ Advise the OSC on the status of medical treatment activities.
- ___ Coordinate with local medical forces for mutual assistance requirements on-scene; activate appropriate procedures if during non-duty hours.
- ___ Act as a liaison with the base medical facility for on- and off-base medical needs.
- ___ Consider recommending the treatment of medical casualties en-route to medical facilities if contamination is suspected or confirmed; and advise the medical facilities of the pending arrival of contaminated patients.

Medical services personnel will:

- ___ Establish an MCC to include the medical NBC Defense Officer.
- ___ Don the appropriate level of protective equipment, based on identification of the agent.
- ___ Provide lifesaving medical care.
- ___ Provide medical support for responders and accident investigation teams.
- ___ Provide technical medical information and advice to the SRC, including information on physiological effects of contamination.

- ___ Issue chemical or biological agent pretreatment drugs, prophylaxis medication, and antidotes; instruct personnel on their use or administer them if appropriate, and provide appropriate medical follow-up for personnel using these substances.
- ___ Coordinate with the MCC for additional resources.
- ___ Decontaminate patients outside the medical treatment facility if

CHECKLIST 7—MEDICAL SERVICES, CASUALTY CARE & MANAGEMENT

they were not fully decontaminated at the incident site.
--

- | |
|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">___ Ensure decontamination of patients prior to entry of any medical facility.___ Coordinate with local hospitals for bed availability. |
|--|

<i>Post -Incident</i>

- | |
|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">___ Continue to provide medical expertise to, and support the needs of, the OSC during recovery operations.___ Develop and make input to incident lessons learned/after action reports. |
|--|

CHECKLIST 8—MEDICAL SERVICES: BIOENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING	
<i>Pre-Incident</i>	
___	Coordinate with Public Health to provide a primary and an alternate representative to the DCG.
___	Conduct sampling of water supplies for chemical, biological, and radiological contamination in accordance with EPA (domestic) or FGS (foreign countries) standards, and increase surveillance as threat dictates.
___	Conduct an assessment upon indication of increased, unexplained illness or health complaints.
___	Organize, equip, and train to respond to WMD incidents.
___	Conduct an installation water vulnerability assessment.
___	Develop and maintain WMD response checklists.
___	Serve on the installation terrorist WMD Threat Response assessment review team.
___	Assist medical readiness personnel in developing medical treatment facility procedures to minimize contamination of medical resources.
<i>Incident</i>	
___	The senior BE representative to the DCG will:
___	Proceed to the incident site and report to the OSC.
___	Advise on personal protective equipment requirements.
___	Advise on contamination control measures.
___	Advise on work/rest cycles for recovery and response personnel.
___	Advise on health risks to workers and the community.
___	Advise on a toxic cordon and evacuation parameters and procedures.
___	Ensure responsibilities of Radiation Safety Officer are executed.
___	Request support from USAF, DoD, and appropriate agencies for follow-on support.

CHECKLIST 8—MEDICAL SERVICES: BIOENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING	
<i>Incident Continued</i>	
___	BE personnel will:
___	Provide a representative to the MCC to serve as the Medical NBC Defense Officer.
___	Track personnel processing through the contamination control area and advise on potential health hazards.
___	Conduct occupational and environmental surveillance and health risk assessment in conjunction with public health.
___	Determine personnel exposure levels.
___	Fit-Test response personnel with the appropriate respiratory protection as required.
___	Assist HAZMAT Team in determining a toxic cordon.
___	Conduct downwind monitoring and determine stay times.
<i>Post Incident</i>	
___	Develop a site health and safety plan.
___	Coordinate or assist Civil Engineer Environmental coordination efforts with EPA, OSHA, and NRC regulators (local national equivalents in foreign countries) on NBC contamination control/restoration.
___	Determine the extent of NBC contamination, develop a sampling plan, and conduct the required sampling.
___	Brief recovery personnel on health hazards and protective measures, and monitor exposures.
___	Verify that site restoration is conducted in a safe and healthy manner.
___	Participate in restoration oversight activities.
___	Monitor the effectiveness of personnel decontamination.
___	Advise mortuary affairs on occupational and environmental concerns regarding contaminated remains.

<i>Post Incident Continued</i>	
—	Develop and make input to incident lessons learned/after action reports.

CHECKLIST 9—EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL	
<i>Pre-Incident</i>	
___	Identify equipment required to respond to an incident.
___	Identify training required to respond to an incident.
___	Train and equip to respond to an incident.
<i>Incident</i>	
___	The senior EOD representative will:
___	Proceed to the DCG assembly area and report to the OSC.
___	Dispatch an EOD team with appropriate equipment to the incident site.
___	Request additional EOD support as needed.
___	EOD personnel will:
___	Conduct the initial Improvised Explosive Device (IED) assessment incident remotely (via robotics) or in appropriate IPE.
___	Report the assessment results to the OSC.
___	Formulate an action plan for unexploded ordnance or improvised explosive, incendiary devices, and any triggering mechanisms.
___	Implement an action plan with the OSC's approval.
___	Deactivate the device or stabilize the site.
<i>Post-Incident</i>	
___	Advise the OSC on WMD device recovery.
___	Coordinate with other agencies for additional support.
___	Develop and make input to incident lessons learned/after action reports.

CHECKLIST 10—CIVIL ENGINEER	
<i>Pre-Incident</i>	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Provide a primary and alternate representative to the DCG.
<i>Incident</i>	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Proceed to the incident site and report to the OSC.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Advise the OSC on the status of emergency response crews, equipment, and vehicles.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Advise the OSC on the status of affected utilities (isolate as necessary) and facilities.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Coordinate repairs, restoration, and other CE emergency support.
<i>Post-Incident</i>	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Assess damage to government and private real property.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Coordinate the restoration efforts of all civil engineer support.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Provide environmental protection advice to comply with local, state, and Federal requirements.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Restore transportation routes.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Restore electrical power to critical facilities.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Restore water and sanitation services.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Take photographs or videotape the damage.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Protect undamaged property.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Close up building openings.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Remove water, debris, and other hazards.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Conduct salvage operations.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Segregate damaged from undamaged property.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Restore equipment and property.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Coordinate contractor support for long-term remediation efforts.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Develop/make input to incident lessons learned/after action reports.

CHECKLIST 10—CIVIL ENGINEER	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Decontaminate exposed food as necessary under close supervision of Public Health.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Fully cooperate with medical personnel when they are investigating possible foodborne and waterborne illnesses. Provide menus, samples, customer lists, etc when requested.

CHECKLIST 11— CE READINESS	
<i>Pre-Incident</i>	
—	Provide a primary and alternate representative to the DCG.
—	Develop Terrorist use of WMD Annex to the Full Spectrum Threat Response Plan 10-2.
—	Establish a contamination control capability; this includes being able to identify contamination, develop decontamination capability using functional resources available to support essential operations within their capabilities, and mark contaminated areas as appropriate.
—	Advise the OSC concerning response and recovery policies and procedures.
—	Implement a training program for responders and base populace.
—	Maintain the Mobile Command Post.
—	Establish the installation's WMD detection, survey, marking, plotting, prediction, and reporting capabilities and associated equipment requirements.
<i>Incident</i>	
The senior CE Readiness representative will:	
—	Proceed to the incident site or designated assembly point and report to the OSC.
—	Serve as the OSC's manager of all activities at the incident site.
—	Record and follow up on OSC-directed DCG actions.
—	Advise on USAF response and recovery policy.
—	Establish assembly areas for the DCG in a controlled environment so functional members can conduct initial briefings, evaluate the situation, and determine on-scene actions.
—	Ensure that a system is in place to readily identify functional area response elements, i.e. vest, caps, armbands
—	Facilitate DCG briefings.

CHECKLIST 11— CE READINESS

- ___ Assist with coordination among the OSC, DCG, and other civil or military authorities involved in the response.
- ___ Supervise specialized teams as required.
- ___ Oversee operation of the Mobile Command Post; maintain a communication link between Command Post and incident site.
- ___ Maintain a log of all on-scene actions and communications.
- ___ Request follow-on elements from the unit control center.
- ___ Advise response elements with information on hazard predictions, evacuation, and cordon size.
- ___ CE Readiness personnel will:
 - ___ Support operation of the initial monitoring point.
 - ___ Identify the type of agent involved as soon as possible to begin comprehensive decontamination and medical intervention.
 - ___ Determine the need for additional follow-on support.
 - ___ Assist in operating the contamination control station.

Post-Incident

- ___ Provide functional expertise to, and support the needs of, the OSC during recovery operations.
- ___ Consolidate input, prepare, and conduct staff coordination of lessons learned and after action reports for the installation commander's review and approval.

CHECKLIST 12—MAINTENANCE	
<i>Pre-Incident</i>	
___	Provide a primary and alternate representative to the DCG.
___	Establish procedures for recall of the maintenance representative.
___	Develop checklists for DCG representative and unit operations.
___	Identify and establish a unit control center to manage resources.
___	Establish a contamination control capability.
<i>Incident</i>	
___	Alert and notify maintenance representative to proceed to the designated assembly point and report to the OSC.
___	Coordinate all requests for maintenance support and provide functional expertise to the OSC.
___	Supervise the evacuation of aircraft/aerospace ground equipment from the incident area.
___	Conduct contamination control actions to ensure system components are decontaminated and recovered.
___	Review functional area checklist: raise maintenance task awareness.
___	Commit unit resources.
___	Coordinate follow-on elements requirements through control center.
___	Coordinate control immediate response and follow-up action.
___	Coordinate and provide maintenance recovery support resources.
___	Develop/make input to incident lessons learned/after action reports.

CHECKLIST 13—PUBLIC AFFAIRS	
<i>Pre-Incident</i>	
___	Provide a Public Affairs representative to the DCG.
___	Keep the installation commander informed of public affairs directives and policy guidance from higher headquarters.
___	Prepare a generic initial new release, applicable to terrorist WMD incidents, in coordination with the installation commander.
___	Identify a primary and alternate representative for the DCG.
<i>Incident</i>	
___	Act as the OSC liaison and spokesperson in responding to public requests for information.
___	Respond to community concerns and deal with the news media at the incident site.
___	Activate a press center, as directed by the OSC.
___	Obtain authorization from OSC to release information.
<i>Post-Incident</i>	
___	Prepare, coordinate, and disseminate news releases.
___	Coordinate still photos and video for release to news media.
___	Report the facts to the public concerning the WMD incident/attack, the government investigation, apprehension of terrorists, recovery operations, and other public interest stories as appropriate.
___	Develop and make input to incident lessons learned/ after action reports.

CHECKLIST 14—TRANSPORTATION	
<i>Pre-Incident</i>	
___	Provide a primary and alternate representative to the DCG.
___	Establish procedures for activating the transportation representatives.
___	Identify and establish a UCC to manage transportation resources.
___	Establish a contamination control capability.
___	Develop checklists for transportation representative to the DCG and UCC operations.
___	Assess and make arrangements for acquiring additional transportation resources to meet local Full Spectrum Threat Response Plan and Resource Protection Plan taskings.
<i>Incident</i>	
___	Alert and notify transportation representative to proceed to the designated assembly location and report to the OSC.
___	Coordinate all requests for transportation support and provide functional expertise to the OSC.
___	Supervise the evacuation of equipment from the incident area.
___	Conduct contamination control actions to ensure transportation system components are decontaminated and recovered.
___	Review functional area checklist to raise awareness of transportation task to be carried out.
___	Commit unit reserves.
___	Advise the OSC on the availability or limiting factors of transportation resources.
___	Obtain cargo or passenger manifests from home station or strategic airlift aircraft, when applicable.
___	Ensure the availability of transportation for all DCG members from the assembly point to the designated on-scene control point.

CHECKLIST 14—TRANSPORTATION	
<i>Incident continued</i>	
—	Establish a contamination control capability for transportation assets. This includes being able to identify contaminate, marking contaminated areas as appropriate, and conducting decontamination to support critical operations within their capabilities.
—	Coordinate requirements for follow-on elements through transportation control center.
<i>Post-Incident</i>	
—	Coordinate action requests and manage transportation assets to meet the needs of the OSC during recovery operations.
—	Develop and make input to incident lessons learned/after action reports.

CHECKLIST 15—WEATHER	
<i>Pre-Incident</i>	
___	Assist in evaluation of WMD software that uses weather data.
___	Deploy and maintain the capability to automatically ingest weather data fields into WMD software.
___	Participate in WMD threat response planning, evaluation and exercises.
___	Provide a representative to the exercise evaluation team.
___	Assist the DCG to establish procedures for obtaining additional weather information in the event of an incident.
<i>Incident</i>	
___	Coordinate required weather support with the SFO.
___	Assist in tailoring hazard prediction calculations to WMD incidents.
___	Provide continuous weather forecast updates.
<i>Post-Incident</i>	
___	Assist in evaluation of effectiveness of current procedures and make necessary changes.
___	Develop and make input to incident lessons learned/after action reports.

CHECKLIST 16—COMMUNICATIONS	
<i>Pre-Incident</i>	
—	Provide a primary and alternate representative to the DCG.
—	Work with the CE to establish and maintain the installation warning system and test the system periodically.
—	Assist the CE Readiness Flight in establishing and maintaining a mobile communications package to support a Mobile Command Post.
—	Identify primary and alternate means of communications; plan for communications and equipment redundancy.
—	Assess overall needs and develop the incident communications plan; establish frequencies and nets for use during an incident.
—	Develop a communications security plan.
—	Ensure frequency compatibility with installation units and with mutual support agreements.
—	Determine communications procedures for aeromedical evacuation operations.
<i>Incident</i>	
—	The communications representative to the DCG will:
—	Proceed to the incident site and report to the OSC.
—	Manage command, control, communications, and computer assets and repair teams through the communications support center.
—	Determine on-site operating frequencies.
—	Monitor frequencies and nets; limit nonessential use of nets.
—	Be responsible for frequency management during incident operations.
—	Maintain the communications log.
—	Coordinate communications with other appropriate entities.
—	Provide on-site communications support, as necessary.
—	Conduct liaison with augmentation elements to coordinate procedures for communications.

CHECKLIST 16—COMMUNICATIONS	
<i>Incident Continued</i>	
___	Evaluate communications capabilities available to support the incident response. Make recommendation to the OSC on whether to request Hammer Ace support.
<i>Post -Incident</i>	
___	Coordinate communications requirements for recovery operations and resumption of mission operations.
___	Develop and make input to incident lessons learned/after action reports.

CHECKLIST 17--INTELLIGENCE	
<i>Pre-Incident</i>	
___	Establish information sharing capability with local law enforcement agencies, and in conjunction with OSI, provide shared information to the FBI.
___	Conduct periodic terrorist WMD threat assessments, monitor the threat as appropriate and provide updates and recommendations to the installation commander and staff.
___	Coordinate and assist in development of threat assessment portions of local emergency response plans.
<i>Incident</i>	
___	The intelligence representative proceeds to the installation command post.
___	Coordinate and provide intelligence information and data gathering support to the installation commander.
<i>Post-Incident</i>	
___	Coordinate actions to assist in development of, and provide input to, incident lessons learned/after action reports.

CHECKLIST 18—STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE	
<i>Pre-Incident</i>	
___	Identify primary and alternate representatives to the DCG.
___	Establish procedures for alerting the staff judge advocate representative during non-duty hours.
___	Identify and establish a focal point within the organization for managing SJA activities during a terrorist WMD incident/attack.
___	Establish a disaster claims team.
___	Ensure DCG and claims team representatives receive appropriate training.
___	In foreign countries, ensure DCG and claims team representatives have official passports and current immunizations.
___	Prepare and maintain a claims kit in accordance with current Air Force claims directives and instructions.
___	Review all local terrorist WMD response plans for legal sufficiency.
___	Obtain appropriate installation maps reflecting nature of Federal jurisdiction for each area (i.e., exclusive, concurrent, proprietary).
___	Establish and maintain current points of contact with appropriate local and state attorneys and law enforcement officials.
___	Brief the installation commander, OSC, DCG and appropriate installation staff members on the role of claims team.
<i>Incident</i>	
___	Alert and notify SJA DCG representative to proceed to the incident site or designated assembly point and report to the OSC.
___	Determine whether claims should be activated.
___	Provide advice and assistance to the OSC and DCG members, as appropriate, on all legal issues arising out of the incident and the Air Force response, including: issues associated with the establishment of a NDA; providing military support to civil authorities; and, providing support to civilian law enforcement officials.

CHECKLIST 18—STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE	
<i>Incident Continued</i>	
___	Provide advice and assistance to responding security force and OSI investigators , as appropriate, including advice on chain of custody/evidence preservation issues.
___	If claims team are mobilized, claims personnel prepare estimates of extent of damage and injuries, dollar estimate of third party damage (if possible), status of funds available at the installation, potential need for advance payment, and need for additional JA manning.
___	If appropriate, establish temporary claims office in proximity to the incident site and advertise location, operating hours, and availability of advance payments.
<i>Post-Incident</i>	
___	Continue to provide advice and assistance, as appropriate to military law enforcement agencies investigating the incident.
___	If appropriate, complete a detailed investigation and process all associated claims.
___	Complete all after action reports required by current Air Force claims directives and instructions.
___	Provide input to the installation lessons learned/after action report and document JA lessons learned.
___	Replenish the claims kit as necessary.

CHECKLIST 19—SERVICES	
<i>Pre-Incident</i>	
___	Provide a primary and alternate representative to the DCG.
___	Determine the level of shelter stocking support necessary to meet incident requirements.
___	Coordinate planning with BE on occupational and environmental concerns regarding contaminated remains.
___	Develop plans in conjunction with CE for disposal of contaminated clothing and equipment.
___	Develop plans for the option of laundering contaminated individual protective clothing for reuse.
___	Develop contaminated remains procedures for mortuary affairs; determine the installation's ability to handle, store, and ship remains.
___	Develop and execute plans to protect all food and water from potential sabotage.
<i>Incident</i>	
___	Upon notification, proceed to the DCG designated assembly point.
___	Coordinate with Medical Services on pronouncement of death procedures, and management of remains of deceased patients at the medical treatment facility or facilities.
___	Coordinate specific hazards with BE on occupational and environmental concerns regarding contaminated remains.
___	Process contaminated remains in accordance with the Base Disaster Preparedness Operations Plan.
___	Ensure proper laundering or disposal of contaminated clothing.

<i>Post-Incident</i>	
—	Coordinate actions and support the mortuary needs of the OSC during recovery operations.

CHECKLIST 20—SAFETY	
<i>Pre-Incident</i>	
___	Provide a representative to participate in WMD threat response planning.
___	Provide a primary and an alternate representative to the DCG.
<i>Incident</i>	
___	Upon notification, proceed to the designated DCG assembly point and report to the OSC.
___	Provide technical safety advice to the OSC and DCG staff.
___	Coordinate all requests for safety support.
<i>Post-Incident</i>	
___	Coordinate safety actions and support the needs of the OSC during recovery operations.
___	Develop and make input to incident lessons learned/after action reports.

CHECKLIST 21—UNIT CONTROL CENTERS	
<i>Pre-Incident</i>	
___	Establish the capability to operate a UCC on a sustained, 24-hour basis as required in support of a terrorist WMD incident/attack.
___	Establish procedures for recall of UCC personnel.
___	Develop checklist for operation of the UCC in support of a response to a terrorist WMD incident/attack.
<i>Incident</i>	
___	Obtain information on the incident.
___	Contact and brief commander and section chiefs.
___	Assemble and dispatch forces as directed, and notify their people to avoid, evacuate, or shelter-in-place in the affected areas.
___	Provide a focal point within an organization to monitor unit resources and mission capability and to coordinate activities during the incident.
___	Maintain emergency response checklists, disaster grid maps, communications equipment, alternate control centers, and recall for assigned response elements.
___	Operate continuously during response operations.
___	Alert, recall, deploy, and supervise organizational response elements.
___	Disseminate threat and emergency action information, disaster cordon evacuation instructions, protective measures and other incident information to all organizational elements.
___	Evaluate and report damage, casualties, and mission capability.
___	Maintain a log of events to document emergency response actions.
<i>Post-Incident</i>	
___	Coordinate actions to manage unit assets to meet the needs of the OSC during recovery operations.
___	Develop and make input to incident lessons learned/after action reports.

CHECKLIST 22—ALL UNITS	
<i>Pre-Incident</i>	
___	Appoint a representative to manage and coordinate unit aspects of the installation Full Spectrum Threat Response Program.
___	Coordinate actions to implement the unit tasks assigned in the Full Spectrum Threat Response Plan 10-2.
___	Request the CE Readiness Flight to perform staff assistance visits to determine unit capability to support planning tasks.
___	Develop and implement response procedures and checklists to support local response plans.
___	Identify unit personnel for assignment and training as members of the Installation Disaster Response Force.
___	Acquire needed emergency response equipment to execute assigned unit response mission.
<i>Incident</i>	
___	Implement unit protective actions as directed by the installation commander.
___	Activate, as directed, assigned unit personnel to report for DRF duty.
___	Activate and operate UCC to support emergency response and recovery operations.
___	Manage unit resources and take appropriate protective actions directed through the installation command and control system.
<i>Post-Incident</i>	
___	Coordinate actions to manage unit assets to meet the needs of the OSC and the DCG during recovery operations.
___	Develop and make input to incident lessons learned/after action reports.



CORDON DISTANCES

USAF Guidance: For WMD Terrorist incident of unknown type, default to 2000' minimum cordon distance

National-Level Guidance

Department of Transportation, *Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG)*

Distribution (plume) factors that may modify cordon distances include:

Amount of substance.

Type of substance (fire, spill, leak, cloud).

Atmospheric conditions (temperature, humidity).

Channeling conditions (urban or rural, mountainous or flat).

Time of day.

Population potentially affected.

Use the guidebook's Green pages for cordon distances for known spills.

Use the guidebook's Orange pages for cordon distances for others.

Basic Guidance = 800 meters (1/2 mile) in all directions; 1 mile if fire is involved.

DoD Guidance

The following publications establish general guidelines, but do not include specific cordon distances.

DoD Manual 3150.8-M, *Radiological Response Procedures*.

Joint Pub 3-11.

For assistance call the Defense Logistics Agency: 1-800-851-8061.

USAF Guidance

HQ AFCEA, *Hazardous Materials Operations, Emergency Response Training* (3-CD set).

When limited information is available pertaining to the agent, guide 111 in the ARG recommends isolation of the spill or leak area immediately for at least 100 to 200 meters (330 to 660 feet) in all directions. If a tank, rail car or tank truck is involved in a fire, ISOLATE for 800 meters (1/2 mile) in all directions; also, consider initial evacuation for 800 meters (1/2 mile) in all directions.

If the material has not been positively identified but is suspected to be a nerve agent or vesicant, use guide 153 in the NAERG.

If you suspect a choking agent, but do not have positive identification, use guide 123 in the NAERG.

Guide 112 in the NAERG provides some guidance when dealing with possible unexploded materials.

USAF On-Scene Commander's Course Handout.

AFMAN 91-201, Explosives Safety Standards, covers public withdrawal distance for nonessential personnel.

For placarded fire symbols refer to the ERG), distances are:

Fire Symbol 4	300 feet
Fire Symbol 3	600 feet
Fire Symbol 2	2,500 feet
Fire Symbol 1	4,000 feet

Facility, tractor-trailer, or truck with unknown content or quantity, evacuate $\frac{3}{4}$ mile.

The following HQ AFCESA training CDs establish general guidelines, but do not include specific cordon or evacuation distances.

Hazardous Materials Operations, Emergency Response Training.
Emergency Response to Terrorism, Basic Concepts.



RESOURCE AGENCIES**AIR FORCE RESOURCES.**

AGENCY	MISSION	CONTACT
Hammer Adaptive Communications Element (Hammer ACE)	Hammer ACE is the Air Force's special-purpose, quick-reaction communications unit supporting emergency and disaster response forces and nuclear incident response. Hammer ACE is flexible, adaptable, and designed to support the communication needs of on-scene commanders with little or no external communications support. Hammer ACE can deploy a three-person team worldwide within three hours of notification.	Scott AFB; DSN 576-3431 (618) 256-3431
Civil Air Patrol	The Civil Air Patrol is an auxiliary of the USAF. It comprises thousands of professionally trained volunteers subject to USAF evaluation to ensure quality and success. The Civil Air Patrol has a variety of resources on hand to respond to USAF needs. Almost all CONUS installations have Civil Air Patrol units for ready, nearby support.	Region specific

AIR FORCE RESOURCES (Con't).

AGENCY	MISSION	CONTACT
WMD Civil Support Teams	The WMD CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS can assist an installation by assessing for a suspected NBC/R event, advising local first responders, or facilitating requests for additional response assets. Although designed to assist the civilian community in its domestic response role, the WMD CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS can be used by CONUS installations. The WMD CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS can be called upon without formal authorization in order to "...save lives, prevent human suffering, or to mitigate great property damage, under imminently serious conditions where there has not been any declaration of catastrophic or major disaster or emergency by the President."	Region specific
Air Force Radiation Assessment Team (AFRAT)	Rapid global response to radiation accidents or incidents, providing on-site health physics, bioenvironmental engineering, and occupational medicine support to the on-scene commander.	Brooks AFB (800) 232-3764

DOD RESOURCES.

AGENCY	MISSION	CONTACT
Chemical-Biological Rapid Response Team (CB-RRT)	The CB-RRT uses the equipment normally available to first responders and specialized equipment available only to DoD agencies. It is supplemented by pre-positioned packages of specialized NBC defense equipment that could be delivered within hours. The team equipment and the pre-positioned packages consist of a equipment for hazard containment, detection, personal protection, and decontamination. CB-RRT can assist emergency responders in detection, neutralization, containment, dismantlement and disposal of WMD.	(410) 436-3668
US Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense (USAMRICD)	The mission of USAMRICD is to provide input in the development of operating procedures and training in the management of chemical agent casualties. The Medical Chemical Biological Advisory Team component also provides clinical advice and consultation in matters related to the initial and long-term management of chemical casualties at the incident site; essential medical information during the recovery phase of the operation for the safe return to normal activities; and on-site training to medical	Aberdeen Providing Ground, Md (410) 436-3276

AGENCY	MISSION	CONTACT
	professionals on the management of chemical and biological casualties.	
US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID)	USAMRIID has many capabilities that can be employed for assessing and evaluating a biological terrorist incident, from initial communication of the threat through incident resolution. USAMRIID can provide two personnel—a medical doctor with expertise in management of casualties caused by biological warfare agents and a scientist with laboratory and scientific expertise on BW agents to participate in the initial response to a potential or known biological incident.	(301) 619-2285
Naval Medical Research Institute (NMRI)	NMRI has multiple missions and capabilities in infectious diseases, combat casualty care, and military operational medicine. NMRI's mission is to defend the Armed Forces against a biological threat in a theater of operation. To provide these, NMRI has developed a Biological Defense Research Program (BDRP) to develop rapid detection methods for biological warfare agents. The BDRP has developed a transportable biological field laboratory expressly for this purpose.	(301) 295-0201

AGENCY	MISSION	CONTACT
Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM)	The U.S. Army's SBCCOM at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, (the center of DoD's chemical and biological expertise), is the lead DoD agency charged with enhancing existing metropolitan response capabilities to nuclear, chemical, and biological incidents. Six separate training courses have been developed to accomplish this task: Awareness, Operations, Technician-HAZMAT, Technician-Emergency Medical Service, Medical Facility Provider, and Incident Command. DoD installations have recently been invited to participate in the so-called "120 cities" program.	Public Affairs Office (410) 436-4345

NATIONAL ASSETS: The following are Federal resources that are available for dealing with WMD incidents. They can be accessed only if a state of emergency is declared by a governor or the President.

AGENCY	MISSION	CONTACT
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)	Presidential Decision Directive 39 gives FEMA principal authority as lead Federal agency for consequence management, delegated by the President, under the provisions of P.L. 93-288, known as the Stafford Act. FEMA is empowered to review and identify response requirements, and to mobilize and	(202) 646-2400 DSN 544-7721

AGENCY	MISSION	CONTACT
	<p>deploy resources to an area affected by a chem/bio incident. FEMA will assume Federal responsibility for consequence management and public safety after an NBC event once the Attorney General has determined that the priority law enforcement goals have been set or are outweighed by consequence management concerns. As the primary agency for EFS #5, Information and Planning, FEMA will coordinate the acquisition of Federal resources for incident mitigation and activate urban search and rescue when needed.</p>	
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)	<p>Presidential Decision Directive 39 gives the FBI principal authority as lead Federal agency for crisis management. The FBI has full authority over NBC terrorist events, but will operate in a unified command structure with the incident commander during the response and rescue phase. Once all viable victims have been removed, primary control will shift to the FBI Special Agent in Charge, and local responders will operate in support of the FBI. Although the FBI has primary law enforcement responsibility for terrorist incidents in the United States, installation commanders are responsible for main-</p>	<p>Local offices are located in most major U.S. cities. The local or supporting AFOSI Detachment normally will contact the FBI for assistance.</p>

AGENCY	MISSION	CONTACT
	taining law and order on their installations. The FBI is responsible for coordinating the activities of all Federal agencies and DoD forces assisting in the resolution of a terrorist chem/bio attack.	
The United States Public Health Service (USPHS) Office of Emergency Preparedness	USPHS has supported the development of a Metropolitan Medical Strike Team as a locally available, NBC-trained incident response team and component of Emergency Support Function #8 of the Federal Response Plan. Tactical medical response strike teams can be mobilized for large-scale WMD terrorist events on a local, state and national basis.	(301) 443-1167
The Department of Energy (DoE)	DOE can play a critical role in providing specialized technical support in a nuclear terrorist event. This support may be more appropriate in a long-term scenario for agent or material removal and disposal.	(202) 586-8100
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)	The CDC are an immediate resource that should be notified as early in the incident as possible; however, it is not likely that CDC personnel can be transported to the site in a timely fashion. Therefore, a reliable communications link should be established for the rapid exchange of information and medi-	(202) 690-8598

AGENCY	MISSION	CONTACT
	cal consultations. CDC can provide consultation on chemical antidotes, decontamination practices, and medical interventions for chemical and biological poisoning.	
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)	The EPA is the primary response agency for ESF #10, Hazardous Materials. Its role is to provide coordinated Federal response to actual or potential release of HAZMAT. In a WMC NBC scenario, their role would involve the long-term remediation and decontamination of the incident site in coordination with other agencies.	(202) 260-4048



HOTLINE AND ON LINE RESOURCES

Note: The Internet sites listed here are current as of April 2001. Users of this Tab should be aware that the Internet is a changing environment. New sites are added frequently. Sites also may be relocated or discontinued. Updated information on online resources will be provided through the AFCESA web site, <http://www.afcesa.af.mil>.

Sites	Web Address
AFRRI	www.afri.ussubs.mil
American Red Cross	www.redcross.org
Army Medical	www.armymedicine.army.mil
Department Center CBIAC	www.cbiac.apgea.army.mil
Chemical and Biological Weapons Chronicle	www.stimson.org
Defense Threat Reduction Agency	www.dtra.mil
Defense Link	www.defenselink.mil
Environmental Protection Agency	www.epa.gov
Soldier and Bio Chemical Command	www.sbccom.apgea.army.mil
FEMA	www.fema.gov
FBI	www.fbi.gov
Int'l Association of Fire Fighters	www.iaff.org
NBC Medical Defense	www.nbc-med.org
Information Server U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infec- tious Diseases	www.usamriid.army.mil
National Domestic Preparedness Office	http://www.ndpo.gov
Sites	Web Address

Domestic Preparedness	http://www.domesticpreparedness.com
NBC Links	http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Quarters/4389/

AGENT MATRICES**CHEMICAL AGENT MATRIX**

Agent Type	Agent; Symbol; Structure	State @ 20°C	Odor	Eye & Skin Toxicity	Rate of Action	Physiological Action	Decontamination
BLOOD	Hydrogen cyanide; AC; HCN	Colorless gas or liquid	Bitter almonds	Moderate	Very rapid	Interferes with body tissues' oxygen use; accelerates breathing rate	None required in open areas; aeration in closed spaces
	Cyanogen chloride; CK; CNCl	Colorless gas or liquid	Pungent, biting; can go unnoticed	Low; lacrimatory & irritating	Very rapid	Chokes, irritates, causes slow breathing rate	None required in open areas; aeration in closed spaces.
	Arsine; SA; AsH	Colorless gas	Mild garlic	None	Delayed 2 hours to 11 days	Damages blood, liver & kidneys	None required

CHEMICAL AGENT MATRIX (Con't)

Agent Type	Agent; Symbol; Structure	State @ 20°C	Odor	Eye & Skin Toxicity	Rate of Action	Physio- logical Action	Decontam- ination
CHOKING	Phosgene; CG; COCl	Color- less gas	New- mown hay; green corn	None	Immediate to 3 hours depending on concen- tration	Damages and floods lungs	None re- quired in open areas; aeration in closed spaces
	Diphos- gene; DP; ClCOOC Cl ₂	Color- less gas	New- mown hay; green corn	Slightly lacrimatory	Immediate to 3 hours depending on concen- tration	Damages and floods lungs	None re- quired in open areas; steam/ammo nia/aeration in closed spaces
VOMITING	Diphenyl- chloro- arsine DA; (C ₆ H ₅) ₂ AsCl	White to brown solid	None	Irritating; not toxic	Very rapid	Like cold symp- toms, plus headache, vomiting, nausea	None re- quired in open areas; caustic soda or chlorine in closed spaces
	Adamsite; DM C ₆ H ₄ (AsCl) (NH) ₂ C ₆ H ₄	Yel- low to green solid	None	Irritating; relatively not toxic	Very rapid	Like cold symp- toms, plus headache, vomiting, nausea	None re- quired in open areas; bleach or DS2 in closed areas.

CHEMICAL AGENT MATRIX (Con't)

Agent Type	Agent; Symbol; Structure	State @ 20°C	Odor	Eye & Skin Toxicity	Rate of Action	Physiological Action	Decontamination
VOMITING	Diphenylcyanoarsine; DC; $(C_6H_5)_2AsCN$	White to pink solid	Bitter almond-garlic mixture	Irritating; not toxic	More rapid than DM or DA	Like cold symptoms, plus headache, vomiting, nausea	None required in open areas; alkali solution or DS2 in closed spaces
INCAPACITATING	3-Quinuclidinylbenzilate; BZ	White crystal	None	--	Delayed; 1 to 4 hours depending on exposure	Rapid heart, vomiting, dry mouth, blurred vision, stupor, random action	Soap & water; hypochlorite or caustic alcoholic solution; M291/M295
TEARING	Chloroacetophenone; CN; C_6H_5COCl	Solid	Apple blossoms	Temporarily severe eye irritation; mild skin irritation	Instantaneous	Causes tearing; irritates eyes & respiratory track	Aeration in open; sodium carbonate solution or alcoholic caustic soda in closed spaces

CHEMICAL AGENT MATRIX (Con't)

Agent Type	Agent; Symbol; Structure	State @ 20°C	Odor	Eye & Skin Toxicity	Rate of Action	Physiological Action	Decontamination
TEARING	Chloroacetophenone in Chloroform; CNC	Liquid	Chloroform	Temporarily severe eye irritation; mild skin irritation	Instantaneous	Causes tearing; irritates eyes & respiratory track	Aeration in open; sodium carbonate solution or alcoholic caustic soda in closed spaces
	Chloroacetophenone and chloropicrin in Chloroform; CNC	Liquid	Flypaper	Irritating; not toxic	Instantaneous	Vomiting and choking agent as well as a tear agent	None required in open; hot solution of soda ash & sodium sulfite in closed spaces
	Chloroacetophenone in benzene & carbon tetrachloride; CNB	Liquid	Benzene	Temporarily severe eye irritation; mild skin irritation	Instantaneous	Powerfully lachrymatory	Aeration in open; sodium carbonate solution or alcoholic caustic soda in closed spaces

CHEMICAL AGENT MATRIX (Con't)

Agent Type	Agent; Symbol; Structure	State @ 20°C	Odor	Eye & Skin Toxicity	Rate of Action	Physiological Action	Decontamination
TEARING	Bromo-benzyl-cyanide; CA $\text{BrC}_6\text{H}_4\text{C}\text{H}_2\text{CN}$	Yellow or solid liquid	Soured fruit	Irritating; not toxic	Instantaneous	Irritates eyes and respiratory passages	20% alcoholic caustic soda
	O-chloro-benzyl-malonitrile; CS $\text{ClC}_6\text{H}_4\text{C}\text{HC}(\text{CN})_2$	Colorless solid	Pepper	Highly irritating; not toxic	Instantaneous	Highly irritating; not toxic	Aeration, soap & water; do not use bleach or STB
	CR $(\text{C}_5\text{H}_4)_2(\text{O})(\text{N})\text{Ch}$	Yellow powder in solution	Burning sensation	Highly irritating; not toxic	Instantaneous	Irritates skin, eyes, nose, and throat	Aeration, soap & water, do not use bleach, detergents, or peroxide
	Chloropicrin; PS Cl_3CNO_2	Liquid	Stinging; pungent	Highly irritating	Instantaneous	Acts as tear, vomiting, and choking agent	Large amounts of water or rinse with a 5% solution of bisulfite.

CHEMICAL AGENT MATRIX (Con't)

Agent Type	Agent; Symbol; Structure	State @ 20°C	Odor	Eye & Skin Toxicity	Rate of Action	Physio-logical Action	Decontam-ination
NERVE	Tabun; GA $C_2H_5OPO(CN)N(CH_3)_2$	Colorless to brown liquid	Faintly fruity; none if pure	Very high	Very rapid	Cessation of breath—death may follow	5% Chlorine (Inanimate Objects), .5% Chlorine (skin), dilute alkali, or DS2; steam/ammonia/aeration in closed spaces; M291/ M295
	Sarin, GB $CH_3PO(F)OCH(CH_3)_2$	Colorless liquid	Almost none if pure	Very high	Very rapid	Cessation of breath—death may follow	Steam/ammonia in closed area; hot soapy water; M291/ M295
	Soman; GD $CH_3PO(F)OCH(CH_3)C(CH_3)_3$	Colorless liquid	Fruity; camphor when impure	Very high	Very rapid	Cessation of breath—death may follow	5% Chlorine (Inanimate Objects), .5% Chlorine (skin), dilute alkali, or DS2; steam/ammonia/aeration in closed spaces; M291/ M295

CHEMICAL AGENT MATRIX (Con't)

Agent Type	Agent; Symbol; Structure	State @ 20°C	Odor	Eye & Skin Toxicity	Rate of Action	Physiological Action	Decontamination
NERVE	Cyclo-sarin; GF $\text{CH}_3\text{PO}(\text{F})-\text{OC}_6\text{H}_{11}$	Liquid	Sweet; musty; peach; shellac	Very high	Very rapid	Cessation of breath—death may follow	5% Chlorine, (Inanimate Objects), .5% Chlorine (skin), dilute alkali, or DS2; steam/ammonia/aeration in closed spaces; M291/M295
	VX; $(\text{C}_2\text{H}_5\text{O})(\text{CH}_3\text{O})\text{P}(\text{O})\text{S}(\text{C}_2\text{H}_5)_2$ $(\text{C}_2\text{H}_5(\text{CH}_3)_2)_2$	Colorless to amber liquid	None	Very high	Very rapid	Produces casualties when inhaled or absorbed	5% Chlorine, (Inanimate Objects), .5% Chlorine (skin), STB slurry or DS2 solution; hot soapy water; M291/M295
NERVE	VX "V sub X"	Colorless liquid	None	Very high	Rapid	Produces casualties when inhaled or absorbed	5% Chlorine, (Inanimate Objects), .5% Chlorine (skin), STB slurry or DS2 solution; hot soapy water; M291/M295

CHEMICAL AGENT MATRIX (Con't)

Agent Type	Agent; Symbol; Structure	State @ 20°C	Odor	Eye & Skin Toxicity	Rate of Action	Physio-logical Action	Decontam-ination
BLISTER	Distilled mustard; HD; $(\text{ClCH}_2\text{C H}_2)_2\text{S}$	Colorless to pale yellow liquid	Garlic or horse-radish	Eyes very susceptible; skin less so	Delayed; hours to days	Blisters; destroys tissue; injures blood cells	5% Chlorine, (Inanimate Objects), .5% Chlorine (skin), fire, DS2, M291 & M295
BLISTER	Nitrogen mustard; HN-1; (same) CH_2H_5	Dark liquid	Fishy or musty	Eyes very susceptible; skin less so	Delayed; 12 hours or longer	Blisters; respiratory tract; destroys tissue; injures blood cells	5% Chlorine, (Inanimate Objects), .5% Chlorine (skin), fire, DS2, M291 / M295
	Nitrogen mustard; HN-2; (same) CNH_3	Dark liquid	Soapy; fruity (high)	Toxic to eyes; blisters skin	Skin—delay 12 hrs or more; Eyes—faster than HD	Similar to HD; bronchopneumonia possible in 24 hours	5% Chlorine, (Inanimate Objects), .5% Chlorine (skin), fire, DS2, M291 / M295
	Nitrogen Mustard; HN-3; N- $(\text{CH}_2\text{CH}_2\text{Cl})_3$	Dark liquid	None, if pure	Eyes very susceptible; skin less so	Serious effects same as HD; minor effects sooner	Similar to HN-2	5% Chlorine, (Inanimate Objects), .5% Chlorine (skin), fire, DS2, M291 /M295

CHEMICAL AGENT MATRIX (Con't)

BLISTER	Phosgene oximedi- chloro- doroxime; CX; CH ₂ NOH	Colorless solid or liquid	Sharp, penetrat- ing	Irritant to eyes/nose ; liquid corrosive to skin	Immediate effects on contact	Violently irritates mucous mem- brane, eyes & nose; forms welts	None entirely effective; wash with large volume of water or DS2
BLISTER	Lewisite; L; ClCHCH- AsCl ₂	Colorless to brownish	Varies; may resemble geranium	Severe eye dam- age; less so to skin	Rapid	Similar to HD, plus may cause systemic poisoning	5% Chlorine, (Inanimate Objects), .5% Chlorine (skin), fire, DS2, M291/ M295
	Mustard & Lewisite mix; HL	Dark, oily liquid	Garlic	Very high	Prompt sting; blis- tering in about 13 hours	Similar to HD, plus systemic poisoning	5% Chlorine, (Inanimate Objects), .5% Chlorine (skin), fire, DS2, M291 / M295
	Phenyldi- chlorar- sine; PD; C ₆ H ₅ AsCl ₂	Colorless liquid	None	633 mg- min/m produces eye casu- alty; less toxic to skin	Immediate eye effects; skin effects in 30 to 60 minutes	Irritates; causes nausea, vomiting and blis- ters	5% Chlorine, (Inanimate Objects), .5% Chlorine (skin), fire, DS2, M291 / M295

CHEMICAL AGENT MATRIX (Con't)

Agent Type	Agent; Symbol; Structure	State @ 20°C	Odor	Eye & Skin Toxicity	Rate of Action	Physiological Action	Decontamination
BLISTER	Ethyldichlorarsine; ED; $C_2H_5AsCl_2$	Colorless liquid	Fruity but biting; irritating	Vapor harmful on long exposure; liquid blisters less than L	Immediate eye irritation; delayed blistering	Damages respiratory tract; affects eyes; blisters; can cause systemic poisoning	None needed in open areas; bleach, caustic soda or DS2 in closed spaces; M291 / M295
BLISTER	Methyldichlorarsine; MD; CH_3AsCl_2	Colorless liquid	None	Eye damage possible; blisters less than HD	Immediate eye irritation; delayed blistering	Irritates respiratory tract; injures lungs and eyes; causes systemic poisoning	5% Chlorine, (Inanimate Objects), .5% Chlorine (skin), DS2, caustic soda, M291 / M295

BIOLOGICAL AGENT MATRIX

Type	Disease	Dispersal	Man-to-Man Transmissibility	Incubation	Lethality	Vaccine	BW Post Exposure Prophylaxis	Treatment
BACTERIA	Anthrax	Aerosol, Powder	No	1-7 days	High	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Brucellosis	Aerosol sabotage (food)	No	Days to months	Low	No	Yes	Yes
	Cholera	Sabotage food/water aerosol	Negligible	1-5 days	Moderate to high	Yes (Limited Efficacy)	No	Yes
	Melioidosis	Aerosol	Negligible	Days to years	Variable	None	No	Yes
	Plague	Aerosol infected vectors	High	2-3 days	Very high	Under Development	Yes	Yes
	Tularemia	Aerosol	No	2-10 days	Moderate if untreated	Yes (IND*)	Yes	Yes
	Typhoid fever	Sabotage food/water aerosol	Negligible	7-21 days	Moderate if untreated	Yes	No	Yes
RICKETTSIAE	Q fever	Aerosol sabotage	No	14-21 days	Very low	Yes (IND*)	Yes	Yes
	Rocky Mtn Spot-ted fever	Aerosol infected vectors	No	3-10 days	High	No	No	Yes
	Typhus (endemic)	Aerosol infected vectors	No	4-15 days	Low	No	No	Yes
	Typhus (epidemic)	Aerosol infected vectors	No	6-16 days	High	No	Yes	Yes

BIOLOGICAL AGENT MATRIX (Con't)

Type	Disease	Dispersal	Man-to-Man Transmissibility	Incubation	Lethality	Vaccine	BW Post Exposure Prophylaxis	Treatment
TOXINS	Botulism	Sabotage aerosol	No	Hours-days	High	Yes (IND*)	Yes Note	Yes
	Ricin	Sabotage Aerosol	No	4-8 hrs	High	No	No	No
	Saxitoxin	Sabotage aerosol	No	Minutes	High	No	No	No
	Staphylococcal enterotoxin B	Sabotage aerosol	No	1-6 hours	Low	Under development	No	No
	Clostridium Perfringens	Sabotage Food/water Aerosol	No	8-12 hours	Low	No	No	No
	Trichothecene mycotoxin	Aerosol Sabotage	No	Hours	High	No	No	No
	Tetrodotoxin	Sabotage food/water aerosol	No	Minutes to hours	High	No	No	No

BIOLOGICAL AGENT MATRIX (Con't)

Type	Disease	Dispersal	Man-to-Man Transmissibility	Incubation	Lethality	Vaccine	BW Post Exposure Prophylaxis	Treatment
VIRUS	Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever	Aerosol	Moderate	3-12 days	High	Experimental	No	Yes
	Chikungunya fever	Aerosol	None	2-6 days	Very low	Experimental	No	No
	Dengue fever	Aerosol	None	3-6 days	Low	Experimental	No	No
VIRUS	Eastern equine encephalitis	Aerosol	None	5-15 days	High	Yes (IND*)	No	No
	Ebola fever	Aerosol	Moderate	7-9 days	High	No	No	No
	Korean hemorrhagic fever	Aerosol	None	4-42 days	Moderate	Experimental	Yes IND	Yes
	Lassa fever	Aerosol	Low to moderate	10-14 days	Unknown	No	No	Yes
VIRUS	Omsk hemorrhagic fever	Sabotage (water) aerosol	Negligible	3-7 days	Low	Experimental	Yes	Yes
	Rift Valley fever	Aerosol infected vectors	Low	2-5 days	Low	Yes	No	Yes

BIOLOGICAL AGENT MATRIX (Con't)

Type	Disease	Dispersal	Man-to-Man Transmissibility	Incubation	Lethality	Vaccine	BW Post Exposure Prophylaxis	Treatment
VIRUS	Russian spring-summer Encephalitis	Aerosol milk	None	8-14 days	Moderate	Yes	No	No
	Smallpox	Aerosol	High	10-17 days	High	Yes (Limited Availability)	Yes (Revaccinate)	No
	Western equine encephalitis	Aerosol	No	1-20 days	Low	Yes (IND*)	No	No
VIRUS	Venezuelan equine encephalitis	Aerosol infected vectors	Low	1-5 days	Low	Yes (IND*)	No	No
VIRUS	Yellow fever	Aerosol	None	3-6 days	High	Yes	No	No

Note: No human studies have been completed for botulism post exposure prophylaxis. Post exposure prophylaxis with antitoxin should only be used in extraordinary circumstances.

***IND – Investigational New Drug protocols must be followed.**

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DCS/Installations & Logistics

ATTACHMENT 1

GLOSSARY

ACC--Air Combat Command
AEF--Aerospace Expeditionary Force
AFCESA--Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency
AFDD--Air Force Doctrine Directive
AFH--Air Force Handbook
AFMAN--Air Force Manual
AFNSEP--Air Force National Security Emergency Preparedness Agency
AFOSH--Air Force Occupational Safety and Health
AFP--Air Force Pamphlet
AFRAT--Air Force Radiation Assessment Team
AFRRI-- Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute
ALOHA--An Air Force software program designed to assist in identification and analysis of HAZMAT
Antiterrorism--Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces.
APOD--Air Point of Departure
APOE--Air Point of Embarkation
ASD--Assistant Secretary of Defense
Asymmetric threat--Emerging threats that are unconventional in nature, such as WMD threats.
AT/FP--Antiterrorism and Force Protection
Baseline--The minimum acceptable standard for an installation's disaster, accident, and incident planning and response posture.
BCP--Base Command Post
BE--Bioenvironmental Engineering functional area
BW--Biological Warfare
CAMEO--An Air Force software program designed to assist in identification and analysis of HAZMAT.
CB--Chemical, Biological
CBIRF--Chemical Biological Incident Response Force

CBRRT--Chemical and Biological Rapid Reaction Team

CCS--Contamination Control Station; a site where contaminated clothing and equipment are removed, and personnel and equipment are monitored and decontaminated.

CDC--Centers for Disease Control

CE--Civil Engineering functional area

CEF--Civil Engineer/Fire

CEX--Civil Engineer/Readiness

CINC--Commander in Chief

Cold Zone--Contains the command post and other support functions deemed necessary to control the incident. No contamination should be present in this zone.

Combating terrorism--Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorism acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum.

Consequence management--Response measures used to protect the health and safety of USAF personnel and to maintain or restore the capability to continue the USAF's strategic force projection mission.

CONUS--Continental United States

Cordon area--A physical barrier around a disaster, accident, or incident scene where controls are established to preclude unauthorized entry.

Counterterrorism--Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.

Crisis management--Response measures or actions designed to identify, acquire, and plan the use of all resources needed to anticipate, prevent, or resolve threat or act of terrorism; it is primarily a law enforcement function that focuses on the criminal aspects of an incident.

Cross-functional--The broad group of actors and functions that combine to provide a more coherent, coordinated planning and response to a disaster, accident, or incident.

DCG--Disaster Control Group; a group of functional experts, on-scene command and control element for response to disasters, accidents, and incidents; under the direction of the OSC.

Decision tree or matrix--A planning and response format used to guide response actors along a coherent response path; See the "If...Then..." decision matrices or trees.

Detect, Assess, Contain, Recover--The four "pillars" that guide and scope the WMD disaster, accident, or incident planning and response process.

Direct Reading Instrument--Instruments that provide a direct readout of measured data such as the Chemical Agent Monitor or the Lower Explosive Limit/Oxygen Monitor (LEL/O2).

DoD--Department of Defense

DoE--Department of Energy

DoJ--Department of Justice

Domestic WMD Incidents--The term used to describe where the FBI has lead agency responsibility i.e., the United States, its territories and possessions, the District of Columbia and other places where the US has jurisdiction.

DOMS--Director of Military Support

DoS--Department of State

DRF--Disaster Response Force; the organization used for disaster, accident, or incident response, command and control, and recovery.

ECP--Entry control point; the point of access/egress from a disaster, accident, or incident site; designated by the OSC.

EIS--Emergency Information Systems

EOD--Explosive Ordnance Disposal

EPA--Environmental Protection Agency

FBI--Federal Bureau of Investigation

FEMA--Federal Emergency Management Agency

FHP--Force Health Protection; the process of optimizing health readiness and protecting service members from all health and environmental hazards associated with military service. A robust health surveillance is a critical component of FHP. Health surveillance includes identifying the population at risk, recognizing and assessing hazardous exposures (medical environmental, and occupational), employing specific countermeasures, and monitoring health outcomes.

FOE--Follow-On Element; the non-emergency response portion of the DCG not included in the IRE; these specialized teams and other support forces pro-

vide enhanced command, control, communications, and other disaster, accident, or incident response capability.

Force Protection--Security programs designed to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, information, and equipment in all locations and situations, accomplished through the planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and security programs.

Foreign WMD Incidents--The term used to describe where the DoS has lead agency responsibility, i.e., WMD incidents that occur on Air Force installations in a foreign country.

FRP--Federal Response Plan

Hammer Ace-- (Hammer Adaptive Communications Element) a deployable communications support element that provides worldwide, single-channel, secure voice and record communications and secure on-site communications.

HAZMAT--Hazardous Materials

HN--Host Nation

Hot Zone--The area immediately surrounding an incident where the highest amount of contamination is found, extending far enough to prevent the adverse effects of hazardous materials to personnel outside the zone.

IAW--In Accordance With

IED--Improvised Explosive Device; a device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to harass, destroy, incapacitate, or distract.

IET--Initial Entry Team

Incident Fulcrum--A broad range of time, both pre-incident and post-incident, where the fulcrum is the time of the incident.

Incident Response Cycle--The pre- and post-incident cycle that includes planning, detection, assessment, containment, and recovery operations.

IND--Improvised Nuclear Device

IRE--Initial Response Element; that portion of the DCG that includes the normal first response to a WMD incident/attack—includes fire, security, medical, EOD (as required); conducts lifesaving, rescue, suppression, and containment activities.

Installation--A grouping of facilities, located in the same vicinity, which support particular military functions.

Installation Commander--The individual responsible for all operations conducted by an installation.

IPE--Individual Response Equipment; HAZMAT level A certified protective equipment for Initial Response Element.

IRE--Initial Response Element

IRP--Individual Readiness Posture

JA--Judge Advocate

JV--Joint Vision; refers to the future doctrine governing DoD operations

JWARN--Joint Warning and Reporting Network; an Air Force software program designed to assist in identification and analysis of HAZMAT.

LEA--Law Enforcement Agency

LFA--Lead Federal Agency; the agencies named in the FRP with primary responsibility for crisis and consequence management.

LGT--Logistics Transportation

Line source--A dispersal technique entailing agent dispersal moving perpendicular to the wind; dependent on favorable meteorological conditions; its counterpart is point source dispersal; See Point Source.

MAJCOM--Major Command

MCC--Medical Control Center

MOA--Memorandum of Agreement

MOPP--Mission Oriented Protective Posture

MOU--Memorandum of Understanding

MSCA--Military Support to Civilian Authorities

MSHA--Mine Safety and Health Administration

MTF--Medical Treatment Facility

NAERG--North American Emergency Response Guidebook

NATO--North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NBC--Nuclear, Biological, Chemical

NBCWRS--NBC Warning and Reporting System

NCA--National Command Authority

NDA--National Defense Area; an area established on non-Federal lands located within the United States or its territories for the purpose of safe-

guarding classified defense information or protecting DoD equipment or material.

NMCC--National Military Command Center

NMR--National Military Response

NMRI--Naval Medical Research Institute

NRL--Naval Research Laboratory

NSC--National Security Council

OCONUS --Outside the Continental United States

OSC--On-Scene Commander; directs [DCG] actions at a disaster, accident, or incident site to mitigate damage, save lives, restore primary mission assets, and assist civil authorities; normally the installation support group commander.

OPLAN--Operations Plan

OPR--Office of Primary Responsibility

OPREP --Operations Report

OSHA--Occupational Safety and Health Administration

OSI--Office of Special Investigations

PA--Public Affairs

PH--Public Health

PHS--Public Health Service

Pillars--The activities--detect, assess, contain, and recover --which are the foundation for the USAF terrorist WMD threat planning and response activities.

PLHCP--Physician or other Licensed Health Care Professional

POC--Point of Contact

Point source--A dispersal means where dissemination occurs from a small device (bomblet or envelope, for example); this dispersal technique overcomes the meteorological requirements for line source dissemination; see Line Source.

PPE--Personal Protective Equipment; NBC defense equipment issued to individuals for use during wartime.

Render safe--The process of disarming or deactivating a device; See IED or IND.

Response Pillars--The activities--detect, assess, contain, and recover--that are the foundation for the USAF full-spectrum threat planning and response activities.

SBCCOM--Soldier and Biological Chemical Command

SCBA--Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus

SECAF--Secretary of the Air Force

SECDEF--Secretary of Defense

SFO--Senior Fire Official; the senior fire department representative who normally takes command of on-scene operations at a disaster, accident, or incident site.

SF--Security Forces

SG--Surgeon General

SJA--Staff Judge Advocate

SME--Subject Matter Expert

SOFA--Status of Forces Agreement; an agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting military force in a friendly country.

SRC--Survivor Recovery Center

Stay time--The length of time a person may remain in contaminated or hazardous areas, particularly in PPE.

Strategy-to-Task--An analytic methodology that establishes and appropriately links goals, through objectives, operational tasks, enabling tasks, functional tasks, and shortfalls, to initiatives to address shortfalls, providing for more clear, concise, coherent definition of a problem.

SME--Subject Matter Expert; functional experts providing function-specific advice to command and control persons or nodes.

Terrorism--The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.

Terrorist Force Protection Condition (FPCON). A DoD-approved system standardizing the Departments' identification of and recommended preventive actions and responses to terrorists threats against U.S. personnel and facilities.

TEU--Technical Escort Unit

UCC--Unit Control Center

UP--Under Provisions of

USAF--United States Air Force

USAMRICD--United States Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense.

USAMRIID--United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases

USC--United States Code

USCG--United States Coast Guard

USD--Under Secretary of Defense

USG--United States Government

USJFCOM--United States Joint Forces Command

VAT--Vulnerability Assessment Team

Warm Zone--Area where personnel and equipment decontamination and hot zone support take place. It includes control points for the access corridor and assists in reducing the spread of contamination, levels of contamination are lower than the Hot zone, sometimes requiring a decreased PPE posture.

WMD--Weapons of Mass Destruction; those instruments (normally considered to be chemical, biological, or nuclear/radiological, incendiary or explosive) capable of producing widespread or massive effects.

WOC--Wing Operations Center